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INHERENT POWERS AND THE LIMITS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH FAKE NEWS
MICHAEL P. GOODYEAR†
INTRODUCTION
In a Vero Beach, Florida, supermarket, Susan Wiles rode her
motorized cart through the produce aisle.1 In any year other than
2020 or 2021, this would have been a routine trip to the grocery
store. But in 2020, Mrs. Wiles was missing an accessory that had
become ubiquitous in society during that year: a face mask.2
Despite causing a commotion, Mrs. Wiles stood by her decision,
claiming that the concerns about COVID-19 were overblown: “I
don’t fall for this. It’s not what they say it is.”3 Mrs. Wiles’
statement is emblematic of the year 2020. This is not the era of
truth, but of alternative facts, fake news, and disinformation.
For most Americans, the novel coronavirus disease 2019
(“COVID-19”) pandemic has dictated our lives for over two years.
But the facts that different Americans adhere to have varied
considerably. For example, in July 2020, Dr. Stella Immanuel
claimed, “This virus has a cure. It is called hydroxychloroquine,
zinc, and Zithromax, . . . I know you people want to talk about a
mask. Hello? You don’t need [a] mask. There is a cure.”4 The
“cure,” despite lacking any scientific support, was touted by
President Donald J. Trump and others to counter medical
recommendations for a lockdown.5 In other cases, individuals
followed other “miracle” cures they found on the Internet, such as
†
J.D., University of Michigan Law School (2020); A.B., University of Chicago
(2016). The author would like to thank Michael Modak-Truran for his ever-invaluable
suggestions and support. He would also like to thank the editors of the St. John’s Law
Review for their diligent efforts on improving this Article and bringing it to print.
1
Tara McKelvey, Coronavirus: Why Are Americans So Angry About Masks?, BBC
NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53477121
[https://perma.cc/S54E-ZU2B].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Daniel Funke, Don’t Fall for This Video: Hydroxychloroquine Is Not a COVID19 Cure, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 31, 2020), https://khn.org/news/dont-fall-forthis-video-hydroxychloroquine-is-not-a-covid-19-cure [https://perma.cc/Z88X-SFCU].
5
Christopher Giles, Shayan Sardarizadeh & Jack Goodman, Hydroxychloroquine:
Why a Video Promoted by Trump Was Pulled on Social Media, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/53559938 [https://perma.cc/4843-SJH6].
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drinking bleach or concentrated alcohol, the latter of which led to
an estimated 800 deaths and over 5,000 hospitalizations
worldwide.6 Others, like Mrs. Wiles, believed rumors that COVID19 is merely an overblown hoax from which doctors and hospitals
can profit.7 Public faith in COVID-19 vaccines is also being
undermined through the widespread circulation of various fake
conspiracy theories about the dangers of vaccines and government
oversight.8
Yet U.S. law largely protects fake news,9 even if it has led to
confusion about proper medical advice and aggravated the state of
COVID-19 in the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States has interpreted the First Amendment to protect fake news
under the long-standing principles of the marketplace of ideas and
counterspeech.10 Yet the protection of such misinformation during
a global pandemic is not just controversial, but deadly. While
much scholarship has been written on fake news in general11 and
on ways to constrain it,12 there has so far been a dearth of legal
6

Md Saiful Islam et al., COVID-19–Related Infodemic and Its Impact on Public
Health: A Global Social Media Analysis, 103 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGIENE 1621,
1622, 1624 (2020).
7
See Adam Satariano, Coronavirus Doctors Battle Another Scourge: Misinformation,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/17/technology/coronavirusdisinformation-doctors.html (detailing how doctors and misinformation researchers have
described an unprecedented slew of misinformation about healthcare during the COVID19 pandemic).
8
Rachel Lerman, Vaccine Hoaxes Are Rampant on Social Media. Here’s How to Spot
Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/12/18/faq-coronavirus-vaccine-misinformation [https://perma.cc/UF3QQ7BP].
9
See infra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., Andrea Butler, Protecting the Democratic Role of the Press: A Legal
Solution to Fake News, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 419, 420, 421–29 (2018) (discussing how
the free press preserves democracy and fake news threatens the press’s legitimacy
and, ultimately, democracy itself); Marin Dell, Fake News, Alternative Facts, and
Disinformation: The Importance of Teaching Media Literacy to Law Students, 35
TOURO L. REV. 619, 620 (2019) (discussing the importance of including media literacy
in legal education); David O. Klein & Joshua R. Wueller, Fake News: A Legal
Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 (Apr. 2017) (discussing potential legal problems
regarding the publication of fake news).
12
See, e.g., Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a Better Theory
for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J. F. 337, 338 (2017) (advocating for greater
regulation by online content platforms); Ari Ezra Waldman, The Marketplace of Fake
News, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 845, 848–49, 869 (2018) (arguing that the marketplace
of ideas rationale should only protect different ideas, not different facts); Daniela C.
Manzi, Note, Managing the Misinformation Marketplace: The First Amendment and
the Fight Against Fake News, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2623 (2019) (suggesting the
regulating of journalists).
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scholarship on the legal regulation of fake COVID-19 news.13
Furthermore, the important approach of inherent powers for
public health has been neglected. This Article aims to fill this gap
in the literature by exploring inherent powers in the United States
and offering a framework for how inherent powers over public
health could allow the federal government14 to regulate fake news

13
See, e.g., Chad G. Marzen & Michael Conklin, Coronavirus “Cures” and the
Courts, 12 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 1 (2020) (discussing liability for fake “cures”
for COVID-19); Jack Goldsmith & Andrew Keane Woods, Internet Speech Will Never
(Apr.
27,
2020,
3:15
PM),
Go
Back
to
Normal,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/what-covid-revealed-aboutinternet/610549 [https://perma.cc/QW76-BB4V] (discussing platforms’ regulation of
COVID-19 misinformation and how this could change the legal censorship landscape
moving forward).
14
While state and local governments also have an important role in fostering
public health, see, e.g., Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police
Powers of the State, 120 PUB. HEALTH REP. 20, 20 (2005) (discussing the doctrine of
state police power); Sarah H. Gordon, Nicole Huberfeld & David K. Jones, What
Federalism Means for the US Response to Coronavirus Disease 2019, JAMA NETWORK
(May 8, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/channels/health-forum/fullarticle/2766033
[https://perma.cc/6LFZ-FH5X ] (describing how public health federalism has worked
during the COVID-19 pandemic), this Article focuses primarily on the federal
government, given that the COVID-19 pandemic and fake news are both nationwide
phenomena that necessitate a uniform federal response. Gordon, Huberfeld & Jones,
supra. Public health has traditionally been addressed primarily at the state level
under the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475
(1996) (“Throughout our history the several States have exercised their police powers
to protect the health and safety of their citizens.”). And as the Supreme Court noted
in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, public health matters were “ ‘primarily, and
historically, . . . matter[s] of local concern,’ . . . the ‘States traditionally have had great
latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs,
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons[.]’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
A global pandemic, on the other hand, is not a limited local outbreak of disease. The
wide variation between state responses to COVID-19 measures so far has shown how
a federalist public health system is poorly equipped to combat a pandemic. See
Gordon, Huberfeld & Jones, supra (“During an emergency, when the health of the
nation depends on acting with coordination and cooperation, the failures of federalism
come into sharp relief, forcing us to reconsider one of the most deeply held American
beliefs: that decisions made closer to home are inherently better.”). In addition,
although the exact delineation between state and federal inherent powers over public
health has never been fully elucidated, the past 200 years of precedent and practice
have shown that the federal government has broad powers over public health. See Two
Centuries of Law Guide Legal Approach to Modern Pandemic, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr.
2020), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2020
/youraba-april-2020/law-guides-legal-approach-to-pandemic [https://perma.cc/29WS76XV]. Quarantine measures have generally been under the purview of the states in
U.S. history, but even in this space the federal government likely has the power to act
under the Commerce Clause. See id.; Alan Dershowitz, Is Biden’s Vaccination
(Sept.
14,
2021,
9:00
AM),
Mandate
Constitutional?,
NEWSWEEK
https://www.newsweek.com/bidens-vaccination-mandate-constitutional-opinion1628586 [https://perma.cc/ASS5-9J7U] (concluding that a pandemic does not
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about COVID-19 due to the countervailing public interest
outweighing First Amendment considerations.
Part I of this Article establishes the contours and severity of
the COVID-19 pandemic. Part II discusses the current status of
fake news under prevailing First Amendment precedent. Then,
Part III turns to the concept of inherent powers, analyzing how
inherent powers have been historically understood both through
Supreme Court precedent and as emergency powers. Part III
continues by specifically addressing inherent powers related to
public health and the inherent power of censoring speech during
wartime. Part IV constitutes the main analysis of this Article.
First, this Article argues that the traditional First Amendment
rationales militate towards lower protections for fake news,
especially in the context of COVID-19 misinformation. Next, it
evaluates whether restrictions on COVID-19 fake news fit within
each of the three historical inherent powers categories: (1) longstanding international custom, (2) powers pursuant to
constitutionally enumerated powers, and (3) emergency powers.
Finding that there are strong countervailing interests in favor of
restricting COVID-19 fake news under all three inherent powers
categories, this Article then concludes by looking to the future of
government regulation of fake news both in public health and in
general.
I. THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented crisis. COVID19 began as an epidemic in mainland China, with the first cases
being confirmed in Wuhan in December 2019.15 From February

recognize state boundaries, and is therefore within federal jurisdiction). But such an
approach has remained untested, even during the 1918–1919 Spanish Influenza. Two
Centuries of Law Guide Legal Approach to Modern Pandemic, supra. These clauses
are especially potent in the context of the online spread of fake news, which practically
always involves individuals in more than one state. Amy Watson, Fake News in the
U.S. – Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (June 16, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/
3251/fake-news/ [https://perma.cc/N7WR-HLH6] (noting that “almost 80 percent of
consumers in the United States reported having seen fake news on the coronavirus
outbreak”). The exact limits of public health federalism are outside of the scope of this
Article, but even if state governments were given primary regulatory control during a
pandemic instead of the federal government, the inherent powers discussed in this
Article can also be utilized by state governments to regulate false information
regarding public health.
15
Chaolin Huang et al., Clinical Features of Patients Infected with 2019 Novel
Coronavirus in Wuhan, China, 395 LANCET 497, 497 (2020).
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2020, the coronavirus spread rapidly around the globe.16 This led
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) to declare it a pandemic
on March 11, 2020.17
As of April 1, 2022, there have been nearly 500 million
confirmed cases of COVID-19, and over six million deaths.18 The
United States has suffered the largest number of cases and deaths,
with over eighty million confirmed cases and nearly one million
deaths.19 For comparison, the number of COVID-19 deaths is over
three hundred times that of the number of victims of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks .20 The number of victims of
COVID-19 is greater than battle deaths in any U.S. war.21
The public health responses to COVID-19 have varied
considerably across the globe and the United States. Nearly every
country instituted some sort of lockdown or at least issued public
health recommendations.22 These exact measures varied, from
blocking international travel and limiting when residents could
leave their houses to issuing public health guidelines and even
suggesting the consumption of vodka and bleach.23 The results
also varied. For example, while the United States continued to hit
prodigious numbers of new daily cases during September 2021,

16
Wagner Gouvea dos Santos, Natural History of COVID-19 and Current
Knowledge on Treatment Therapeutic Options, BIOMEDICINE & PHARMACOTHERAPY,
Sept. 2020, at 1.
17
Id.
18
COVID-19 Dashboard by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE)
at Johns Hopkins University (JHU), JOHNS HOPKINS CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR. (Sept. 16,
2021, 9:21 AM), https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [https://perma.cc/YSK5-HQRN]
(The COVID-19 Dashboard is udpated daily.).
19
Id.
20
See September 11 Terror Attacks Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 18, 2020, 2:25 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4UJ5-3CSX] (noting that 2,977 people were killed in the September
11 attacks in New York City, Washington, DC, and outside of Shanksville,
Pennsylvania).
21
See America’s Wars, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS. (Nov. 2020),
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_americas_wars.pdf (noting that the
greatest number of battlefield deaths was 291,557 in World War II, while the greatest
number of overall deaths was in the Civil War, in which 498,332 Union and
Confederate soldiers died).
22
See Coronavirus: The World in Lockdown in Maps and Charts, BBC NEWS (Apr.
7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52103747 [https://perma.cc/QD7F-68MC]
(charting local and national measures against COVID-19 in every country).
23
Id.; Katie Rogers et al., Trump’s Suggestion That Disinfectants Could Be Used
to Treat Coronavirus Prompts Aggressive Pushback, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/trump-inject-disinfectant-bleachcoronavirus.html.
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New Zealand had less than one thousand active cases24 and
Taiwan reported less than fifteen new positive tests per day.25
Responses have also varied considerably across U.S. states,
both initially and throughout the pandemic. For example,
Vermont initially imposed strict quarantine requirements for
visitors and only started to re-open after the first wave at a very
slow, careful pace.26 Despite being an initial hot zone of COVID19 in the spring of 2020, New York City emerged as one of the safer
areas of the country by that summer through following stricter
social distancing protocols.27 Meanwhile, more rural states in the
Midwest saw a massive spike in the number of cases from fall 2020
through early 2021.28 Perhaps unsurprisingly, those few states
that never instituted stay-at-home orders, such as Iowa, saw a
precipitous rise in cases during this period.29 As one Atlantic
article succinctly put it, this is “what happens when a government
does basically nothing to stop the spread of a deadly virus.”30
The pandemic also bred an economic crisis in the United
States. A 2021 Congressional report painted a bleak picture of the
economic fallout from COVID-19, with “elevated levels of poverty,
lives upended, careers derailed, and increased social unrest.”31
Among lower-income adults, forty-six percent reported that they
24
COVID-19:
Current
Cases,
N.Z.
MINISTRY
HEALTH,
https://www.health.govt.nz/our-work/diseases-and-conditions/covid-19-novelcoronavirus/covid-19-data-and-statistics/covid-19-current-cases
[https://perma.cc/RNQ2-YGUW] (last updated Sept. 16, 2021, 1:00 PM).
25
TAIWAN CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En (last visited
Oct. 8, 2021).
26
Tucker Doherty et al., Which States Had the Best Pandemic Response?, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/14/best-state-responses-to-pandemic429376 [https://perma.cc/GF3K-TQ8S] (last updated Oct. 15, 2020, 4:05 PM).
27
Ivan Pereira, How New York Has Been Able to Keep Coronavirus at Bay While
Other States See Surges, ABC NEWS (July 17, 2020, 5:05 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/york-coronavirus-bay-states-surges/story?id=
71772507 [https://perma.cc/3UZG-XQ97].
28
Jonathan Levin & Lynn Donaldson, Covid Ravages Rural America, Sweeping
Through Montana’s Plains, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-30/covid-ravages-rural-americasweeping-through-montana-s-plains.
29
See Reopening Plans and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html
(last updated July 1, 2021) (using maps and charts to show current COVID-19 orders
and laws in each state).
30
Elaine Godfrey, Iowa Is What Happens When Government Does Nothing,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/12/howiowa-mishandled-coronavirus-pandemic/617252/ [https://perma.cc/95XL-74QS].
31
JAMES K. JACKSON ET AL., Introduction, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46270, GLOBAL
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COVID-19 (July 9, 2021).
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“have had trouble paying their bills” since the start of the
pandemic.32 Fifteen percent reported being laid off due to the
pandemic, with young adults being the hardest hit.33 Racial and
ethnic minorities were the most affected, with more Latinos and
Asian-Americans reporting that someone in their household was
laid off than other racial groups.34 By August 2020, approximately
57.4 million Americans had filed for unemployment benefits since
the start of the pandemic, over a fourth of Americans over the age
of eighteen.35 However, even this large number was lower than it
could have been due to the Paycheck Protection Program, a
multimillion dollar stimulus plan for businesses to retain their
employees.36 In addition, lost jobs led to increased rates of
homelessness and evictions in the United States.37
States varied widely in how they addressed this economic
crisis. Colorado paid out unemployment claims quickly and Iowa
and Minnesota paid the highest average wage replacement rates
of any state in the country.38 Massachusetts and Connecticut were
standouts in acting to prevent evictions.39 An agency order by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) and the
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), which was
extended several times, temporarily halted residential evictions
from September 4, 2020 through August 26, 2021.40 However, the
social and economic responses by individual states have varied
considerably, with social distancing measures and economic and
32
Kim Parker, Rachel Minkin & Jesse Bennett, Economic Fallout From COVID19 Continues to Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24,
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-fallout-fromcovid-19-continues-to-hit-lower-income-americans-the-hardest.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Jack Kelly, Jobless Claims: 57.4 Million Americans Have Sought Unemployment
Benefits Since Mid-March—Over 1 Million People Filed Last Week, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2020,
11:13 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/08/20/jobless-claims-574-millionamericans-have-sought-unemployment-benefits-since-mid-marchover-1-million-peoplefiled-last-week/?sh=161fcda16d59 [https://perma.cc/3K43-SNER].
36
Id.
37
Coronavirus Leads to Increase in Homelessness in the US, DW NEWS (Sept. 26,
2020), https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-leads-to-increase-in-homelessness-in-theus/av-54798441 [https://perma.cc/T6RP-78HD].
38
Doherty et al., supra note 26.
39
Id.
40
Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions To Prevent the Further Spread of
COVID-19, 85 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55292, 55297 (Sept. 4, 2020); see also Alabama Assoc.
of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (holding
that the CDC had almost certainly exceeded its authority and declining to vacate the
stay).

326

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:319

legal support coming in noticeably different amounts depending
on where one lives.41
In short, COVID-19 has upended the American society of
yesteryear and caused nearly a million deaths already. There are
many reasons why the pandemic harmed the United States to such
a degree, including the government squandering opportunities to
prepare in advance for the spread of COVID-19, the bloated and
inefficient U.S. healthcare system, underfunding of public health,
and a voracious resistance in certain sectors—including the
Trump White House—to sound social distancing measures.42
Undoubtedly, one such significant factor is the prevalence of fake
news.
False information about COVID-19 has been promulgated on
social media, spreading misinformation about how COVID-19
functions, where it came from, and how to treat it.43 Some of these
fake news stories, such as 5G radiation causing COVID-19 or
China purposefully creating COVID as a bioweapon,44 do not
directly pose a serious problem to public health. But, as scientific
studies have shown, fake news has also been linked to influencing
people’s behavior regarding public health, including whether they
social distance and get tested, or flout scientific opinion and
instead opt for conspiracy theories and the like.45 A significant
part of U.S. society encounters fake news and deems it reliable,
meaning that fake news poses a significant threat to suppressing
the pandemic.46
Social media and easy access to online

41
The Best and Worst States to Work in America – During COVID-19, OXFAM,
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/issues/economic-well-being/covid-map
[https://perma.cc/NL3H-HL4J] (last visited Oct. 8, 2021) (An interactive chart ranking
all fifty states’ responses to COVID-19.).
42
See Alex Fitzpatrick & Elijah Wolfson, COVID-19 Has Killed Nearly 200,000
Americans. How Many More Lives Will Be Lost Before the U.S. Gets It Right?, TIME (Sept.
10, 2020, 6:15 AM), https://time.com/5887432/coronavirus-united-states-failure
(describing the myriad reasons why the U.S. COVID-19 response was so ineffective
compared to that of other countries); Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Defeated America,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/
coronavirus-american-failure/614191 [https://perma.cc/BD6L-3Q4A] (describing the
various ways in which COVID-19 spread quickly in the United States).
43
Islam et al., supra note 6, at 1621.
44
Mark Easton, Coronavirus: Social Media ‘Spreading Virus Conspiracy
Theories’, BBC NEWS (June 18, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53085640
[https://perma.cc/84T2-SSYJ]; Nic Fleming, Fighting Coronavirus Misinformation,
583 NATURE 155, 156 (2020).
45
Jon Roozenbeek et al., Susceptibility to Misinformation About COVID-19
Around the World, 7 ROYAL SOC’Y OPEN SCI. 1, 11–13 (2020).
46
Id. at 12–13.
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information has contributed to a dangerous conflagration of
misinformation in the midst of a global pandemic, threatening
human health and safety.47 Scientists and the WHO have strongly
advocated for countries to take stronger action to stop the spread
of fake news about COVID-19.48 Yet there is a problem with that
recommendation in the United States: fake news is protected by
the First Amendment.
II. FAKE NEWS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Fake news is largely protected as free speech under the First
Amendment. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press[.]”49 It is one of the most sacred rights enshrined in the Bill
of Rights, and it is essential to democracy and U.S. culture.50
While the First Amendment does not directly address false
statements in the context of free speech, the Supreme Court has
created a regime that protects the vast majority of speech, whether
true or false.
As a general rule, free speech is protected by the First
Amendment, with the Supreme Court having only identified
certain narrow exceptions. The Court has ruled that obscenity,51

47

Josh Reisberg, How to Protect IP Against COVID-19 Scammers Leveraging
Social Media Algorithms to Legitimize Fake Products, WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP.,
Nov. 10, 2020, at 1.
48
COVID-19 Disinformation: How to Spot It—and Stop It, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS
(Feb.
12,
2021),
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/covid-19disinformation; COVID-19 Pandemic: Countries Urged to Take Stronger Action to Stop
Spread of Harmful Information, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news/item/23-09-2020-covid-19-pandemic-countries-urged-totake-stronger-action-to-stop-spread-of-harmful-information.
49
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
50
See Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U.
L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2016) (“Freedom of speech does more than protect democracy; it
also promotes a democratic culture.”).
51
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining obscene materials as
those that “appeal to the prurient interest in sex,” depict or describe “sexual conduct
in a patently offensive way,” and lack “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value”).
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defamation,52 incitement of imminent lawless action,53 fighting
words,54 true threats,55 speech integral to criminal conduct,56 and
child pornography57 are categories of speech that the government
may regulate. Commercial speech has also received less First
Amendment protection, particularly if the speech is misleading.58
But fake news is not one of those excluded categories. The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that false statements have less
value than true ones and that they should receive less protection
under the First Amendment.59 But the Court has only said this in
the context of legally cognizable harms.60 Acknowledging that
many falsehoods do not fall within this category, the Supreme
52
However, in cases of public interest, plaintiffs must prove a requisite level of
intent by the defendant. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)
(holding that in matters of public interest, “States may not permit recovery of
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that the law “prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”).
53
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (advocating the use of force or
lawbreaking is protected “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
54
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (defining fighting
words as those “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace”).
55
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“ ‘True threats’ encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals.”).
56
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (rejecting the
contention that “the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity
to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute”).
57
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (defining child pornography as
“limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified
age”).
58
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)
(“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the
government’s power is more circumscribed.”).
59
Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact
are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual’s reputation that cannot
easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective.”); Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (stating that false statements “are not protected by
the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements”); see also United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 732 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Such false factual
statements are less likely than are true factual statements to make a valuable
contribution to the marketplace of ideas.”).
60
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719.
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Court reasoned in in United States v. Alvarez that “some false
statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous
expression of views in public and private conversation[.]”61 False
information can only be restricted if it causes a cognizable harm,
namely by way of those statements being either misleading
commercial information (fraud) or defamatory.62
On the other hand, false information that does not create a
concrete injury is protected. Indeed, while Alvarez is one of the
most recent incarnations of this point, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly defended the protection of false information under the
First Amendment.63 The Supreme Court has been reticent to
expand the limited exceptions to the First Amendment, worrying
that the government could become the ultimate arbiter of free
speech.64 The Alvarez Court was less concerned about the dangers
of false information than that the ends of free speech and discourse
“are not well served when the government seeks to orchestrate
public discussion through content-based mandates. . . . Only a
weak society needs government protection or intervention before
it pursues its resolve to preserve the truth.”65
This protection of false information has been upheld on the
basis of needing to preserve a marketplace of ideas and
counterspeech.66 The marketplace of ideas theory is built on the
dissent of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Abrams v. United
States and the concurring opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis in
Whitney v. California.67 In Abrams, Justice Holmes wrote that
“the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in

61

Id. at 718.
Id. at 719.
63
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“[E]rroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected[.]”); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444–45 (1963) (“[T]he Constitution protects expression and
association without regard to . . . the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas
and beliefs which are offered.”); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940)
(“[I]n spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long
view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of
a democracy.”).
64
Brittany Vojak, Note, Fake News: The Commoditization of Internet Speech, 48
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 123, 145 (2017).
65
567 U.S. at 728–29.
66
Michael P. Goodyear, Is There No Way to the Truth? Copyright Liability as a
Model for Restricting Fake News, 34 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 279, 285 (2020).
67
Rodney A. Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas” in First
Amendment Law, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 437, 437–38 (2019) (citations omitted).
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ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market[.]”68 He noted,
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of
the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.69

In Whitney, Justice Brandeis reiterated this theory, stating “that
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones.”70 Justice Brandeis counseled that
“[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech[,]” citing the example of the colonial witch trials.71 Since
these two opinions were published, the Supreme Court has
continuously invoked the marketplace of ideas metaphor in First
Amendment cases, mentioning it explicitly in over 100 opinions.72
The other doctrine that is central to free speech protection is
counterspeech. Justice Brandeis was the first to express this
doctrine in Whitney v. California.73 He reasoned that “[i]f there be
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”74 Counterspeech is
an outgrowth from the marketplace of ideas theory.75 It reacts to
speech in the marketplace, creating a fight between ideas.76 If the
marketplace is capable of “distinguishing between truth and
falsity,” an environment that encourages as much speech as
possible is desirable so that the fight between speech and
counterspeech will result in the truth.77

68

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id.
70
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
majority opinion overruled on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,
449 (1969).
71
Id. at 376.
72
Smolla, supra note 67, at 438–39.
73
Philip M. Napoli, What if More Speech Is No Longer the Solution? First
Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter Bubble, 70 FED. COMMC’NS L.J.
55, 60 (2018).
74
Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
75
Napoli, supra note 73, at 61.
76
Dawn Carla Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1519, 1526 (2019).
77
Napoli, supra note 73, at 61.
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Yet these two rationales are deeply problematic, relying on
the fantasy of a perfectly rational audience, which is a poor match
for how the U.S. population consumes information in the twentyfirst century.78 The marketplace of ideas and counterspeech
doctrines only work if one assumes that all participants in the
marketplace place a greater value on truth than falsity and that
the majority of participants in the marketplace will be exposed to
the truth.79 In addition, the marketplace of ideas should by its
very name protect ideas and not facts, which are not debatable.80
The breakdown of the marketplace of ideas and counterspeech
has accelerated due to technological changes over the past two
decades.81 Public policy professor Philip M. Napoli has identified
several potentially fatal problems with these doctrines due to
technological advancements.82
Media ecosystems have
transformed practically beyond recognition.83 Serious journalism
has declined due to economic trends harming traditional print
media, while fake news is less costly to produce and can generate
greater revenues today due to the ease of distribution through the
Internet and social media.84 Gatekeeping by traditional media and
journalism has been reduced due to the open access nature of the
Internet.85 Technological advances and algorithms have allowed
purveyors of fake news to target individuals who are particularly
vulnerable to misinformation.86
The marketplace of ideas and counterspeech are also
premised on there being an exchange of ideas. Social media and
news aggregation services have effectively created filtered bubbles
where individuals consume content that matches their preexisting preferences and opinions, and they are thus not exposed
to countervailing ideas.87 The sheer amount of information online
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Goodyear, supra note 66, at 286.
Napoli, supra note 73, at 61.
80
Waldman, supra note 12, at 848.
81
Napoli, supra note 73, at 68.
82
See generally id.
83
Id. at 70–71 (describing how the Internet has greatly changed how individuals
consume media).
84
Id. at 69–71; Yariv Tsfati et al., Causes and Consequences of Mainstream Media
Dissemination of Fake News: Literature Review and Synthesis, 44 ANNALS INT’L
COMMC’N ASS’N 157, 162 (2020) (“[J]ournalists complain that reporting has become
‘increasingly sloppy’ and that ‘bottom-line pressure is hurting journalism’[.]”).
85
Napoli, supra note 73, at 71–74.
86
Id. at 74–77.
87
See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: HOW THE NEW PERSONALIZED
WEB IS CHANGING WHAT WE READ AND HOW WE THINK (2011).
79
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has also crippled individuals’ ability to distinguish between
legitimate and false news.88 The rapid speed at whichh false news
stories are dissemniated over social media is also a serious
challenge to the efficacy of the marketplace of ideas doctrine, as
consumers quickly learn this false information, and counterspeech
must take time to respond and saturate the market.89
But despite these serious problems with the marketplace of
ideas and counterspeech doctrines, they persist as bases for broad
First Amendment protections.90 As articulated in Alvarez, the
government cannot regulate fake new because the marketplace of
ideas and counterspeech are the proper vehicles for society coming
to the truth.91 To overcome the First Amendment and infringe
upon individuals’ First Amendment right to spread fake news,
there is a very stringent test. To regulate protected speech, the
government must meet the high bar of either strict or intermediate
scrutiny depending on whether the government is regulating the
content of the speech.92 Strict scrutiny requires a content-based
restriction on speech to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest.93 Intermediate scrutiny requires a time,
place, or manner restriction on speech to be substantially related
to an important government interest.94 These are extremely high
barriers to regulating false information.
This strong protection for false information is especially
dangerous at this point in history, when fake news has proliferated
to an extreme extent. The number of traditional reporters has
continued to dwindle while more Americans are turning to the
Internet,95—and, more specifically, social media—as their primary
88

Napoli, supra note 73, at 79–85.
Id. at 85–87.
90
See generally Michael P. Goodyear, Priam’s Folly: United States v. Alvarez and
the Fake News Trojan Horse, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 194 (2021) (discussing why the
Alvarez framework for protecting fake news is a poor fit for the modern online
dissemination of disinformation).
91
United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012).
92
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994).
93
See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005); Ozan O. Varol, Strict in
Theory, but Accommodating in Fact, 75 MO. L. REV. 1243, 1245–47 (2010).
94
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
95
See Digital News Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 23, 2019),
https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/digital-news (discussing the patterns of U.S.
consumption of news from online sources); Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their
(Oct.
11,
2019,
10:35
AM),
News
From
Social
Media,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-americans-are-getting-theirnews-from-social-media/#e1aee33e1791 [https://perma.cc/U45P-22RG] (describing a study
that found that social media is an integral part of the modern U.S. population’s news diet).
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source of news.96 The marketplace of ideas is no longer filled with
ready access to factual counterspeech, but is full of false ideas that
are presented as the truth.97 Getting news from the Internet
combines content filters, insular online communities, rapid idea
dissemination, profit incentives, and amplification of fringe ideas
into a disinformation maelstrom.98 For example, fake news
wreaked havoc during the 2016 election99 and has even become a
tool in war.100
Perhaps the most harmful fake news campaigns of them all
have been directed against science.101 For example, law professors
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss and John Diamond have found that

96

See Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Nov./Dec.
2009),
Journalism,
COLUM.
https://archives.cjr.org/reconstruction/the_reconstruction_of_american.php (describing the
Internet’s crucial role in U.S. news consumption in the twentieth century, including the
possibilities and dangers created by the Internet for journalism and news consumption);
Michael Griffin, How News Has Changed, MACALESTER (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.macalester.edu/news/2017/04/how-news-has-changed [https://perma.cc/J9RS6JSB] (describing the historical trajectory of news and media history in the United States).
97
See Vojak, supra note 64, at 130.
98
Syed, supra note 12, at 345–53. The World Economic Forum went as far as
denouncing online misinformation as “digital wildfires” that pose a serious global
problem. Digital Wildfires, WORLD ECON. F., https://reports.weforum.org/global-risks2018/digital-wildfires (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
99
Two notable highlights were fake news stories that alleged that Democratic
nominee Hillary Clinton was running a sex trafficking ring from a pizza parlor and selling
weapons to the Islamic State. Amanda Robb, Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, ROLLING
STONE (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:07 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/feature/anatomy-of-a-fakenews-scandal-125877 [https://perma.cc/8DWY-D53G]; Hannah Ritchie, Read All About It:
The Biggest Fake News Stories of 2016, CNBC (Dec. 30, 2016, 2:04 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/12/30/read-all-about-it-the-biggest-fake-news-stories-of2016.html [https://perma.cc/3JNC-BN2R].
100
In the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh,
both pro-Armenia and pro-Azerbaijan news sources claimed that the other side
engaged in a fake news campaign. See, e.g., Dilara Aslan, Research Reveals Extent of
Armenian Fake News on Mercenaries in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, DAILY SABAH
(Oct. 8, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/research-revealsextent-of-armenian-fake-news-on-mercenaries-in-nagorno-karabakh-conflict/news
[https://perma.cc/H5AN-THE8] (accusing Armenians of propagating fake news); Paul
Antonopoulos, Azerbaijani Media & Government Repeatedly Caught Making Fake
News About War Against Armenia, GREEK CITY TIMES (Oct. 8, 2020),
https://greekcitytimes.com/2020/10/08/azerbaijan-fake-news [https://perma.cc/T3PGR6DY] (claiming that Azerbaijanis propagated fake news).
101
See Nicky Woolf, Obama Is Worried About Fake News on Social Media – and We
(Nov.
20,
2016,
1:50
PM),
Should
Be
Too,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/nov/20/barack-obama-facebook-fake-newsproblem [https://perma.cc/UF3X-BX9D] (documenting “myths and lies about vaccination
and . . . global warming”).
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misrepresentation about vaccines creates very real dangers.102 “A
false statement that a vaccine is safe, when it is not,” can cause
serious harm.103 False statements that deter people from getting
vaccines by incorrectly alleging that they carry certain risks can
lead to a larger outbreak by preventing the achievement of herd
immunity, risking long-term health complications and even
death.104
The anti-vaxxer movement in the United States is one of the
best-known misinformation campaigns.105 Its successes have had
terrible consequences. In 2017, an outbreak of measles among the
Somali-American community in Minnesota was directly linked to
anti-vaccine activists’ efforts to convince that community that the
measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine causes autism.106 Similar
anti-vaxxer campaigns against target populations led to measles
outbreaks among the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in
Brooklyn in 2013 and 2019.107 The 2019 outbreak lead to 1,234
confirmed cases of measles, including 125 individuals that needed
hospitalization.108 The public health risks posed by anti-vaxxers
led many social media platforms to remove anti-vaxxer content.109
The danger to society was simply too high.
The spread of anti-scientific views on health and vaccines
ballooned during COVID-19 and intensified the dangers of the

102
See generally Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & John Diamond, Measles and
Misrepresentation in Minnesota: Can There Be Liability for Anti-Vaccine
Misinformation That Causes Bodily Harm?, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531 (2019).
103
Id. at 561.
104
Id.
105
See Jan Hoffman, How Anti-Vaccine Sentiment Took Hold in the United States,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/health/antivaccination-movement-us.html (discussing the history of the anti-vaxxer movement
in the United States); Azhar Hussain, Syed Ali, Madiha Ahmed & Sheharyar Hussain,
The Anti-Vaccination Movement: A Regression in Modern Medicine, CUREUS, July 3,
2018, at 1–5 (reviewing the rise of the modern anti-vaxxer movement, the importance
of the Internet in its rise, and the repercussions for public health).
106
Rubinstein Reiss & Diamond, supra note 102, at 532, 551 (explaining that
fourteen children were hospitalized and one narrowly avoided death, having been on
a ventilator for fifteen days after developing Measles pneumonia).
107
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, When Public Health Is Eroded by Junk Science:
Muzzling Anti-Vaxxer FEAR Speech — and the First Amendment, (Mar. 9, 2020)
(manuscript at 9–10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3550670.
108
Stephanie Soucheray, US Measles Cases Hit 1,234 as Brooklyn Outbreak
Called Over, CIDRAP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/newsperspective/2019/09/us-measles-cases-hit-1234-brooklyn-outbreak-called-over.
109
See Page Trotter & Scott Stroud, Case Study: Anti-Vax Censorship on Social
Media—Limiting or Lifesaving?, 30 MEDIA ETHICS, 2019, at 1 (describing the
restriction of anti-vaxxer content by websites such as Pinterest and Amazon).
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pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a much greater
impact on the United States than the isolated outbreaks of others
diseases, which only impacted certain communities. Unlike the
measles outbreaks in Minnesota and Brooklyn, COVID-19 was not
caused by false information.110 However, the trajectory of COVID19 in the United States has been greatly affected by the spread of
fake news about the coronavirus.111 As mentioned above, fake
news about COVID-19 has affected people’s public health
behavior.112 An ongoing study by Princeton University has
identified thousands of fake news stories about COVID-19 on
social media.113 Fake news is especially likely to spread in the
context of COVID-19, as individuals seek out anything to regain a
sense of control over an existential threat.114 The inverse is also
true: people tend to downplay factual information that is
threatening.115 Continuing resistance to wearing face masks is
directly counter to medical advice, which recommends them as one
of the most effective ways to reduce the spread of COVID-19.116
Many still believe that COVID-19 is no worse than the seasonal
flu, despite epidemiologists reporting that COVID-19 is likely far
deadlier than the flu, with a fatality rate of 0.5–1% versus 0.1%
110
See Claire Felter, Will the World Ever Solve the Mystery of COVID-19’s Origin?,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
RELS.
(June
3,
2021,
2:05
PM),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/will-world-ever-solve-mystery-covid-19s-origin?gclid=
CjwKCAjwos-HBhB3EiwAe4xM94VhrPffUoppN9nFK_yABp-zqHYf3RdxpF
UnoByGiOSv9fB2OzJP5hoCKTcQAvD_BwE (explaining that while the exact cause of
COVID-19 is unknown, many scientists believe it spread from animals to humans).
111
See Zara Abrams, Controlling the Spread of Misinformation, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2021/03/controlling-misinformation.
112
See supra Part I.
113
Jacob N. Shapiro, Jan Oledan & Samiskshya Siwakoti, ESOC COVID-19
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EMPIRICAL
STUD.
CONFLICT
(2020),
https://esoc.princeton.edu/publications/esoc-covid-19-misinformation-dataset.
114
Greg Nyilasy, Fake News in the Age of COVID-19, PURSUIT (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/fake-news-in-the-age-of-covid-19 (explaining
that, for the same reason, in the past people turned to magical beliefs or religion to
regain some sense of control over natural disasters).
115
Id. (noting examples of cigarette and alcohol consumption in the past).
116
See, e.g., Jason Abaluck et al., The Case for Universal Cloth Mask Adoption
and Policies to Increase the Supply of Medical Masks for Health Workers, (Apr. 1,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3567438 (describing the
efficacy of universal cloth mask adoption to stem the onslaught of COVID-19); see also
Elizabeth Chuck, Necessary or Needless? Three Months into the Pandemic, Americans
Are Divided on Wearing Masks, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2020, 3:03 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/necessary-or-needless-three-monthspandemic-americans-are-divided-wearing-n1231191 [https://perma.cc/7Z75-XBYX]
(describing Americans’ contrary views on wearing masks during the COVID-19
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for influenza.117 Others turned to false treatments such as
hydroxychloroquine, which in turn breeds a false sense of safety
among individuals.118 Those suggesting working towards herd
immunity also ignored the untold numbers of deaths it would
cause, as presented by the example of Sweden, which aimed for
herd immunity only to have much higher rates of death than its
neighbors.119 This confusion and misunderstanding about the
dangers of COVID-19 has only aggravated its harm to
Americans.120
Even now that there are viable vaccines for COVID-19,
individuals, especially anti-vaxxers, have sowed much doubt about
the side-effects of the vaccine and spread associated conspiracy
theories.121 For months before viable vaccines were first released
to the public in December 2020,122 conspiracy theories about, for
instance, vaccines containing microchips and tracking technology
were widely shared on social media.123 These claims, despite being
widespread, are baseless.124 Other fake news stories exaggerated
true stories to extreme degrees. A report that people who took the
Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine developed Bell’s palsy was true, but the
number of cases was only four out of 22,000 recipients, a rate that
is consistent with the normal incidence of Bell’s palsy in the
population.125 Despite this non-threat, the exaggerated story

117
Tanya Lewis, Eight Persistent COVID-19 Myths and Why People Believe Them,
SCI. AM. (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/eight-persistentcovid-19-myths-and-why-people-believe-them [https://perma.cc/YY2J-DDUH].
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See id.
119
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HEALTHLINE
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NEWS (May
27, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-52731624
[https://perma.cc/DT25-M9F2].
121
Jack Goodman & Flora Carmichael, Covid Vaccine: ‘Disappearing’ Needles and
Other Rumors Debunked, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/55364865
[https://perma.cc/8667-G5LK]; Lerman, supra note 8; Lewis, supra note 117.
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Available for You?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2020, 9:49 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/thecovid-19-vaccine-when-will-it-be-available-for-you-11606339361 (describing the rollout of
vaccines after they were first released in December 2020).
123
Katherine J. Wu, No, There Are No Microchips in Coronavirus Vaccines., N.Y.
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gained popularity on social media, fostering vaccine hesitancy.126
Social media companies have tried to limit the spread of fake
COVID-19 news, but fake news stories are still shared quickly and
widely across social media communities.127 The spread of doubt
about vaccines is a serious risk to public health. Indeed, the WHO
declared vaccine hesitancy one of its top ten global health risks in
2019.128
Francesco Rocca, President of the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, described
fake news about COVID-19 and the virus as a “parallel pandemic”
that must be defeated.129 The undermining of public faith in
vaccines through the circulation of fake news poses a serious
problem to achieving herd immunity and ultimately ending the
COVID-19 pandemic.
These false beliefs, and their spread, are perhaps just as
dangerous as the virus itself.130 If everyone followed proper social
distancing protocols and public health advice, “the number of new
cases you could count on your fingers and toes,” said Andy Slavitt,
President Barack Obama’s former acting Administrator of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.131 But fake news
about COVID-19 undermines adherence to this sound public
health advice.132 Scientists and the WHO have strongly advocated
for countries to take stronger action to stop the spread of fake news
regarding COVID-19.133
Scholars have suggested that the
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visited Oct. 8, 2021).
129
Harmeet Kaur & Naomi Thomas, ‘Fake News’ About a Covid-19 Vaccine Has
Become a Second Pandemic, Red Cross Chief Says, CNN (Dec. 1, 2020, 1:21 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/01/media/red-cross-chief-warns-vaccine-mistrusttrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/U5B8-66E5].
130
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government and social media should act to block fake news.134
Keeping COVID-19 under control, which may require staunching
the flow of COVID-19 fake news, is an essential prerequisite for
life in the United States, and the U.S. economy, to return to
normal.
In response to this problem, at least one piece of legislation
has been proposed that aligns with those suggestions. On July 22,
2021, Senator Amy Klobuchar introduced the Health
Misinformation Act of 2021 in the Senate.135 The bill would carve
out an exception to Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act, which immunizes websites from content posted on their
platform by third-parties or for good faith restriction of access to
such material by the platform.136 The bill would remove this
immunity for a website that, during a public health emergency,
promotes third-party posted “health misinformation through an
algorithm used by the provider (or similar software
functionality).”137 However, if this law is passed, in effect, it would
do nothing, as there is no underlying cause of action for health
misinformation, so no claim could be brought against online
platforms.138
In addition, as explained above, such approaches to health
misinformation face a critical roadblock: fake news is protected by
the First Amendment. Unlike false commercial speech, like the
marketing of counterfeit medical protective products,139 fake news
is generally not circumscribed by legal restrictions. This has been
the case even with COVID disinformation, as a district court
recently noted in dicta.140 Scholars have tried to formulate First
134

Nyilasy, supra note 114.
S. 2448, 117th Cong. (2021).
136
Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
137
S. 2448.
138
See Mike Masnick, Senators Klobuchar and Lujan Release Ridiculous, Blatantly
Unconstitutional Bill to Make Facebook Liable for Health Misinformation, TECHDIRT (July
23, 2021, 9:28 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20210722/17302447227/senatorsklobuchar-lujan-release-ridiculous-blatantly-unconstitutional-bill-to-make-facebookliable-health-misinformation.shtml [https://perma.cc/T596-XVRW].
139
Reisberg, supra note 47, at 3.
140
See Cohoon v. Konrath, No. 20-cv-00620-BHL, 2021 WL 2356069, at *5 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 24, 2021). In Cohoon, a sheriff forced a teenager to remove a social media
post in which she said she tested positive for COVID. Although the teenager
ultimately tested negative for COVID, her statement was not false, as her doctor
told her that she may have been positive despite the negative test. The court, citing
to Alvarez, noted that “even if Amyiah’s posts had been untruthful, no court has ever
suggested that noncommercial false speech is exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny.” Id. (citing 567 U.S. at 720).
135
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Amendment arguments to restrict fake news in the context of
public health. Rubinstein Reiss and Diamond tried to fit actual
injuries due to fake news over vaccines into a tort liability context
for misrepresentation, allowing free speech while imposing
consequences for negligently or intentionally providing misleading
information on vaccines.141 Bioethics scholar Barbara Pfeffer
Billauer recommends a new First Amendment balancing test that
will weigh the interests of free speech against the dangers posed
by the anti-vaxxer movement.142 These new modifications of First
Amendment doctrine might be viable long-term, but in the short
term, there is another avenue for regulating COVID-19 fake news
that has so far been largely unexamined in legal literature:
inherent powers.
III. INHERENT POWERS
The dangers of fake news to the spread of COVID-19 are
significant, yet current First Amendment doctrine effectively
prevents the U.S. government from regulating fake news.
However, despite U.S. law generally being considered to flow from
enumerated powers in the Constitution, there is also a body of law
around the U.S. government’s inherent powers, those that are
innate to all independent governments in the world.143 Inherent
powers have been recognized many times by the Supreme Court
and, indeed, have been recognized in the public health and free
speech contexts specifically.144 Due to the undefined nature of
many inherent powers, a brief history of inherent powers in
general, emergency powers, public health inherent and emergency
powers, and emergency censoring of speech is necessary to lay the
analytical framework for regulating fake news through inherent
federal powers.

141

Rubinstein Reiss & Diamond, supra note 102, at 560–62.
Pfeffer Billauer, supra note 107, at 22–28 (advocating for adapting the
imminent lawless incitement test from Brandenburg v. Ohio into a two-pronged timephase inquiry, which looks at whether the measure will be used to stem published
health misinformation during or before an outbreak).
143
See generally Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (holding that the federal
government has inherent powers).
144
See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–27 (1905) (regarding
public health); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332 (1920) (regarding free speech);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (regarding free speech).
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Inherent Powers in U.S. Law

In the seminal Supreme Court case of McCulloch v. Maryland,
Chief Justice John Marshall unequivocally concluded that “[t]his
government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated
powers.”145 This was reaffirmed more recently by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist in United States v. Lopez, where he wrote, “[w]e
start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers.”146 Some scholars, such as law
professor Steven G. Calabresi, welcomed this statement as a “long
overdue” return to the federal government being one of “limited
and enumerated powers.”147
Yet despite these forceful assertions, the powers of the federal
government are not limited to those enumerated in the
Constitution. As law professor David S. Schwartz has argued, the
federal government is not really limited to enumerated powers; by
the Constitution’s very nature, implied or inherent powers are
necessary.148 Even Chief Justice Marshall understood this, stating
in McCulloch: “A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all
the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the
means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake
of the prolixity of a legal code . . . .”149
The Constitution
enumerates its “great outlines” and “important objects,” but much
must still be “deduced.”150
In deducing the rest, the Supreme Court has recognized a
series of federal powers based on the concept of inherent powers.151
An inherent power is “[a] power that necessarily derives from an
office, position, or status.”152 It is a power that can neither be found
in the text of or indirectly implied in the Constitution.153 By their
very nature, inherent powers are nebulous and ill-defined, with
145

17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
147
See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”:
In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995).
148
See David S. Schwartz, A Question Perpetually Arising: Implied Powers,
Capable Federalism, and the Limits of Enumeration, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 573, 609–10
(2017) (describing how legislative powers granted by the Constitution could not
function without implied powers).
149
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
150
Id.
151
See id.; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574, 589 (1823); Prigg v.
Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 618–19 (1842).
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Inherent Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019).
153
Cheng-Yi Huang, Unenumerated Power and the Rise of Executive Primacy, 28
WASH. INT’L L.J. 395, 426 (2019).
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the term “inherent” being open to a flood of interpretations.154 But
at the very least, inherent powers are not unchecked powers.155 By
analyzing some of the most significant Supreme Court decisions
and emergency actions by different presidential administrations
in the past two centuries, three specific veins in inherent powers
emerge.156
1.

Supreme Court Precedent

The doctrine of inherent powers has a longstanding position
in Supreme Court jurisprudence that has developed over time. In
Johnson v. M’Intosh, in 1823, the Supreme Court recognized the
discovery doctrine, the ability to acquire territory through
discovery or, rather, conquest, based on the “universal recognition
of these principles.”157 This was one of the earliest invocations of
inherent powers of the federal government. The issue in that case
was who had proper title to a plot of land in Georgia, an individual
who had earlier purchased the land from the Indian tribes that
controlled it or a different individual who later purchased the land
directly from the U.S. government.158 Chief Justice John Marshall
found that the nations of Europe, such as Great Britain, Spain,
Portugal, France, and Holland, had recognized the right of
occupancy by Indians, but also “a power [of the European
154

Louis Fisher, Introduction: Invoking Inherent Powers: A Primer, 37
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 1, 2 (2007).
155
See Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A Comparative Perspective,
115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2483 (2006) (comparing American inherent executive power
practices with those of the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Mexico, and South
Korea, concluding that all of these nations have recognized that limits must be placed
on executive power).
156
There is also substantial jurisprudence over the inherent powers of courts. See,
e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1890 (2016) (holding that “a federal district
court has the inherent power to rescind a jury discharge order and recall a jury for
further deliberations after identifying an error in the jury’s verdict”); Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (holding that the “District Court, sitting in
diversity, properly invoked its inherent power in assessing as a sanction for a party’s
bad-faith conduct attorney’s fees and related expenses paid by the party’s opponent to
its attorneys”). There are also several Supreme Court cases on the inherent powers of
Indian tribes. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004) (holding that
Indian tribes could prosecute nonmember Indians as an exercise of their inherent
authority); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (affirming that
Indian tribes have inherent powers subject only to the restrictions of the U.S.
Constitution, federal statutes and regulations, and the Jicarilla Apache Constitution).
However, these two sets of inherent power precedent are outside of the scope of this
Article, which focuses on inherent federal legislative and executive powers.
157
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574, 587–589 (1823); see also Jones v. United
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
158
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 550–62.
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governments] to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the
natives.”159 Therefore, title granted by the tribes prior to the land
coming under U.S. authority was not valid.160 Justice Marshall
recognized that “neither the declaration of independence, [sic] nor
the treaty confirming it, could give us more than that which we
before possessed, or to which Great Britain was before entitled.”161
In other words, the United States had inherent powers, but those
inherent powers were no greater than those of other nations, since
they were inherent to nationhood itself. Justice Marshall then
recognized the right of ownership through discovery as an
inherent national right:
If the discovery be made, and possession of the country be taken
under the authority of an existing government . . . it is supposed
to be equally well settled, that the discovery is made for the whole
nation, that the country becomes a part of the nation, and that
the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the
government which has the constitutional power to dispose of the
national domains, by that organ in which all vacant territory is
vested by law.162

The next major invocation of inherent powers was in the 1842
case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania. In Prigg, the Supreme Court
recognized the power to legislate in effectuation of the rights and
duties provided for under the Constitution.163 The issue was
whether Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law, under which Prigg
was prosecuted for capturing an escaped slave from Maryland
inside Pennsylvania, was constitutional.164 Pennsylvania’s law
was preempted by the federal Fugitive Slave Act, but
Pennsylvania argued that since the Fugitive Slave Act was not an
enumerated power of Congress under the Constitution, it was
invalid.165 The Supreme Court instead found that the Constitution
guaranteed possession of enslaved peoples, and “the natural
inference certainly is, that the national government is clothed with
the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it.”166 The
Court explicitly rejected limiting Congress’ powers to those

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id. at 574–81.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 595.
See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 616 (1842).
Id. at 539.
Id. at 618, 622.
Id. at 615.
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enumerated in the Constitution.167 The federal government is
inherently provided with the means, or legislative authority, “to
carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the
[C]onstitution.”168 Although the slavery upon which Prigg was
premised has been long since overturned, the principle of inherent
powers from Prigg is still extant.
Following Prigg, the 1880s proved to be the busiest period of
inherent powers decisions in the Supreme Court, with the Court
deciding four important decisions on inherent powers during this
decade. In the first of these, United States v. Jones, the Court
recognized the inherent power to take private property for public
uses, the right of eminent domain.169 The case was centered on
lands in Wisconsin that had been ceded in 1846 by the federal
government to the state to improve navigation along the Fox and
Wisconsin Rivers.170 The land was eventually transferred to the
Green Bay and Mississippi Canal Company, but in 1870, Congress
passed a law authorizing the payment of a lump sum to reacquire
the land it had ceded in 1846.171 The actual issue in the case was
whether the federal government was obligated to pay for damages
caused by the dams flooding third parties’ lands.172 In one part of
the decision, the Court rejected the notion that a taking is not
lawful until proper compensation is made, instead concluding that
“[t]he power to take private property for public uses, generally
termed the right of eminent domain, belongs to every independent
government.”173 It then states that eminent domain is “an incident
of sovereignty, and . . . requires no constitutional recognition.”174
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is “merely a limitation upon
the use of the [inherent] power . . . of disposing, in case of necessity
and for the public safety, of all the wealth of the country.”175
A year later, in Juilliard v. Greenman, better known as the
Legal Tender Case, the Supreme Court held that the federal
government could make paper money legal tender for private
debts.176 The issue in the case was whether United States legal
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id. at 618.
Id. at 616.
109 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1883).
Id. at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 514–15.
Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 518–19.
110 U.S. 421, 449–50 (1884).

344

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:319

tender notes could be legal tender for all public and private
debts.177 The Supreme Court found that “Congress has the power
to issue the obligations of the United States in such form, and to
impress upon them such qualities as currency for the purchase of
merchandise and the payment of debts, as accord with the usage
of sovereign governments.”178 The Court noted that “impressing
upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the
payment of private debts, was a power universally understood to
belong to sovereignty.”179 The fact that this practice was longstanding was of particular importance for the Court.180 The Court
also saw the inherent power to make legal tender fortified by the
constitutional vesting of Congress with the exclusive power to coin
money.181 The fact that this decision turned on inherent powers is
further suggested by the dissent, which explicitly opposed
inherent powers.182 Despite the dissent’s protests, inherent
powers were once again recognized by the Court.
In United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court returned to
questions of sovereignty and American Indian tribes. The issue
presented in the case was whether the Major Crimes Act, which
allowed the federal government to prosecute felonies by Indians
against other Indians in Indian country, was constitutional.183 The
Constitution itself is nearly silent in regard to relations with
Indian tribes within the United States’ borders.184 The Court did
not find the two clauses in the Constitution that do mention Indian
tribes, the “Indians not taxed” clause and the Commerce Clause,
helpful to answering the question at hand.185 Instead, the
Supreme Court relied on inherent powers, concluding that,
this power of [C]ongress to organize territorial governments, and
make laws for their inhabitants, arises, not so much from the
clause in the [C]onstitution in regard to disposing of and making
rules and regulations concerning the territory and other property
of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in
which the territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty
177

Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 447.
179
Id. (emphasis added).
180
See id. at 447–48.
181
Id. at 448.
182
Id. at 467 (Field, J., dissenting) (“Congress can exercise no power by virtue of
any supposed inherent sovereignty in the general government.”).
183
118 U.S. 375, 375–76 (1886) (referring to the Major Crimes Act as the ninth
section of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385).
184
Id. at 378.
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Id. at 378–79.
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which must exist in the national government, and can be found
nowhere else.186

The Court held that Congress has the power to legislate for Indian
tribes through an inherent duty of protection over all U.S.
territory.187
In the final inherent powers case from the 1880s, the Chinese
Exclusion Case, or Ping v. United States, the Court held that the
federal government had the inherent power to exclude aliens from
its territory, deeming it a power “incident of every independent
nation.”188 While the power to exclude foreigners is not explicitly
granted by the Constitution, the Supreme Court found that the
“power of exclusion of foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the [C]onstitution.”189
Then, nearly fifty years later, in perhaps the greatest
endorsement of inherent powers, Justice George Sutherland wrote
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the federal
government had complete authority over foreign affairs, reasoning
that otherwise the United States would not hold complete
sovereignty on par with the rest of the family of nations.190 The
Supreme Court determined that not all powers of the federal
government are articulated in the Constitution, nor need they
be.191 Justice Sutherland noted that “[t]he powers to declare and
wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never
been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the
federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”192 In
referring to other inherent powers, the Court concluded that those
powers need not be expressed in the Constitution, as they “exist as
inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality.”193
While the opinion in Curtiss-Wright has been criticized,194 it is still
186

Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
Id. at 383–85.
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130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); see also Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711
(1893) (“The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens . . . [is] an
inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation . . . .”).
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Ping, 130 U.S. at 609 (emphasis added).
190
299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419–21 (1819).
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Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
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Id. (emphasis added).
194
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2002) (discussing various scholars’ criticisms of Curtiss-Wright
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valid law. Indeed, while Curtiss-Wright may be one of the clearest
articulations of inherent powers, inherent powers had been long
established in a variety of legal spheres, as articulated above.195
Law professor Cheng-Yi Huang notes that although CurtissWright often stands for the proposition that the President is the
sole organ of foreign affairs, it is more accurately read in the
broader arc of inherent powers in U.S. law, under which the
federal government has long relied on inherent powers to justify
its actions in both foreign and domestic affairs,196 such as in the
examples above.
Then, in 1952, the Supreme Court addressed the bounds of
inherent powers in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. In
Youngstown, President Truman ordered the Secretary of
Commerce to take direct control of steel plants in response to
nationwide labor strikes.197 The government “asserted that a
strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so
endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the
President had ‘inherent power’ to do what he had done[.]”198 The
government argued that the President had this power pursuant to
his authority as the Commander in Chief of U.S. military forces.199
But the Supreme Court was hesitatant; in his concurring opinion,
Justice Robert Jackson famously noted that one “may also suspect
that [the Founders] suspected that emergency powers would tend
to kindle emergencies.”200 Indeed, Justice Jackson was extremely
skeptical of inherent powers. In his concurring opinion, he

as an anomaly or Justice Sutherland’s discussion of inherent powers as dicta). The
most recent Supreme Court majority opinion to address Curtiss-Wright was Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the Court interpreted Curtiss-Wright to not give
unfettered jurisdiction over U.S. foreign policy to the President alone, but to the
President and Congress. 576 U.S. 1, 20–21 (2015). While Zivotofsky at least partially
abrogated the famous language from Curtiss-Wright that the President is the “sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations[,]” 299 U.S. at
320, it did not address the part of Curtiss-Wright related to inherent powers.
195
See supra notes 159–205 and accompanying text; see also Cleveland, supra
note 194, at 7.
196
See Huang, supra note 153, at 425–26 (“This is the inherent power of the
President, which enables him or her to gain preemptive power in the realm of foreign
affairs. . . . The contrast between domestic and international issues has become less
and less apparent. . . . Therefore, it is implausible to argue that the [P]resident enjoys
inherent powers in the terrain of international relations but not in the domestic
context.”).
197
343 U.S. 579, 582–83 (1952).
198
Id. at 584.
199
Id. at 582.
200
Id. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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rejected inherent powers to put down labor strikes during times of
war, but even he noted that a more serious emergency, such as an
imminent invasion or threatened attack, could justify the use of
inherent powers.201 Instead, Justice Jackson laid out his wellknown three categories of presidential power: power authorized by
the Constitution, power authorized by Congress, and power in the
“zone of twilight” where Congress has not yet acted.202 Justice
Jackson saw Congress as the gatekeeper for inherent powers,
placing limits on what the President could do during an
emergency.203
2.

Emergency Powers

In a separate line of actions, the executive and legislative
branches have declared inherent powers pursuant to emergency
situations, like those President Truman tried to invoke in
Youngstown. Like the Supreme Court decisions related to
inherent powers, the parameters of emergency powers have
developed over time, creating the emergency powers regime that
exists today. A national disaster constitutes an emergency,
granting the President extraordinary powers that must be used
quickly and decisively, and limits the role of Congressional
oversight or judicial review.204 As the Supreme Court has stated,
“no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of
the Nation.”205
Emergency powers have been especially pronounced in
military contexts, pursuant to the President’s role as Commander
in Chief.206 In the earliest, and perhaps most well-known example,
President Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus

201

Id. at 645.
Id. at 635–38.
203
Id. at 653.
204
Joshua L. Friedman, Emergency Powers of the Executive: The President’s
Authority When All Hell Breaks Loose, 25 J. L. & HEALTH 265, 267 (2012) (addressing
the question of how broad the President’s emergency powers are during a crisis).
205
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (citing Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
206
See generally William B. Fisch, Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the
United States, 38 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 389 (1990) (discussing how the Supreme Court
has interpreted emergency powers over the course of U.S. history); see also David
Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 566–67 (2008)
(arguing in favor of shifting away from broad invocation of inherent powers under the
Commander in Chief power).
202
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at the start of the Civil War.207 During the Civil War, President
Lincoln used the excuse of war to both suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and institute military trials.208 President Lincoln received
significant pushback, including a federal court decision by
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney209 which declared the
suspension of habeas corpus invalid by concluding that prisoner
John Merryman should be released.210 But ultimately Congress
passed legislation authorizing the President to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus “whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may
require it.”211
More recently, the George W. Bush administration justified a
range of activities under the guise of inherent power
authorization, including “creat[ing] military commissions,
designat[ing] U.S. citizens as ‘enemy combatants,’ condon[ing]
torture as an interrogation technique, engag[ing] in ‘extraordinary
rendition,’ and conduct[ing] warrantless National Security Agency
(NSA) eavesdropping.”212 As with President Lincoln, Congress
partially acquiesced to these “inherent” powers due to the
perceived national emergency following the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001.213
207
6 COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 258 (John G. Nicolay & John Hay
eds., new and enlarged ed. 1894) (reproducing President Lincoln’s April 27, 1861 order
to General Winfield Scott granting him authority to suspend habeas corpus between
Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.); see also Fisher, supra note 154, at 2–4.
208
Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln, Presidential Power, and the Rule of Law, 113 NW.
U. L. REV. 667, 681–85, 688 (2018).
209
There is a debate, however, about whether the decision was issued by the
Circuit Court for the District of Maryland or Chief Justice Taney in his personal
capacity, and whether Chief Justice Taney even had the authority to issue the
decision. Seth Barrett Tillman, Ex Parte Merryman: Myth, History, and Scholarship,
224 MIL. L. REV. 481, 504–05 (2016).
210
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 151–52 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487); see
also Farber, supra note 208, at 681–85. The exact dimensions of the Ex parte
Merryman decision have been examined in detail by Seth Barrett Tillman. See
generally Tillman, supra note 209. Tillman notes that Taney’s opinion asserted that
Merryman should be freed, but that his order left Merryman in jail, throwing the
actual precedential power of Merryman into question. Id. at 495–506.
211
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755.
212
Fisher, supra note 154, at 12–19.
213
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001); see also Ari D. MacKinnon, Counterterrorism and Checks and Balances: The
Spanish and American Examples, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 602, 623–36 (2007) (discussing
how the U.S. legal counterterrorism model was crafted, including from claims of
“inherent constitutional authority”); John Wynne, After Al-Qaida: A Prospective
Counterterrorism AUMF, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1884, 1887–89 (2018) (discussing the
example of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (“2001 AUMF”), which
was passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 attacks).
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The state of emergency declared by the Bush administration
was renewed by President Barrack Obama, and there were a total
of thirty ongoing states of emergency during the Obama
administration.214 Pursuant to these emergency powers, the
President has been authorized to block property of and
transactions involving designated individuals,215 suspend
minimum wage requirements in public contracts,216 and engage in
a long list of other emergency powers.217 President Donald J.
Trump also proclaimed a dozen national emergencies.218
The hallmarks of inherent powers, as recognized in these
cases and examples, are: (1) long-standing practice by the family
of nations,219 (2) powers that would naturally be needed to carry
out, or are incidental to, the enumerated powers in the
Constitution, and (3) emergency situations. In Johnson, Jones,
the Chinese Exclusion Case, and Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme
Court stressed the long-standing and universal practice of the
family of nations in these areas.220 Yet, in Prigg and Julliard, the
Court instead relied on these powers being so related to extant
214
Patrick A. Thronson, Note, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America’s
Emergency Law Regime, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 738 (2013).
215
See International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2001)
(“[During national emergencies], the President may . . . investigate, regulate, or
prohibit—(i) any transactions in foreign exchange, (ii) transfers of credit or payments
between, by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers
or payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof, (iii) the
importing or exporting of currency or securities.”).
216
40 U.S.C. § 3147 (2002).
217
See Patrick A. Thronson, Compendium of Emergency Powers Statutes, 46
MICH. J. L. REFORM, Mar. 31, 2013 (cataloging all statutory provisions and
presidential orders as of 2013 containing powers based on the declaration of a national
emergency).
218
Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act,
BRENNAN CTR. JUST., (June 10, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/declared-national-emergencies-under-national-emergenciesact [https://perma.cc/NJH3-9NLY]; see also Scott Horsley, Many Presidents Have
Declared Emergencies—But Not Like Trump Has, NPR (Feb. 15, 2019, 3:19 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/15/695203852/many-presidents-have-declaredemergencies-but-not-like-trump-has [https://perma.cc/9R7R-JMT6].
219
In this regard, inherent powers overlap with customary international law, the
“ancient usage among civilized nations.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686
(1900); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. L. INST. 1987) (stating that custom arises from “general
and consistent practice of states”).
220
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574, 587, 589 (1823); United States v. Jones,
109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See also Cleveland, supra
note 194, at 6–7 (discussing how inherent federal powers developed over Indian tribes,
immigration, and territories).
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constitutional powers as to be inherent,221 and the federal
government tried to make the same argument in Youngstown.222
Notably, Kagama stands as an amalgam of both principles.223
Control of all national territory is an inherent right of all nations,
but the duty to protect Indian tribes is also pursuant to their
status as “domestic dependent nations,” the exact formation of
which was elucidated by the Supreme Court in an earlier case by
relying on the Taxing and Spending Clause.224 But even the Court
in Kagama relied principally on long-standing international
practice as the justification for the inherent power of control over
all national territory.225 Emergency powers have instead relied on
authorized responses during particular circumstances, but have
not necessarily relied on long-standing international practice or
specific enumerated powers.226 Therefore, the inherent powers
test is not comprised of three required prongs, but three potential
grounds for validity: long-standing practice by nations, powers
necessary for or incidental to enumerated powers, and responses
to national emergencies.
B.

Inherent Powers Related to Public Health

1.

Quarantines

The practice of utilizing inherent powers to address public
health concerns has been a longstanding practice among nations.
Governments have obligations to the public to serve as the
euphemistic parent of those under their jurisdiction in matters
related to public health and safety.227 Perhaps the best known
example of inherent public health powers is the quarantine, which
restricts the free movement of people.228
The very term
“quarantine,” coming to English from the Italian word for “forty,”
possibly stretches back to the age of the ancient Greek
221

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 616–19 (1842); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U.S. 421, 449–50 (1884).
222
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
223
See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
224
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831); Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380.
225
Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380.
226
See generally Thronson, supra note 217.
227
See generally Michele Goodwin et al., Quarantine and the Limits of Government by
Prof. Michele Goodwin, UNIV. CAL. IRVINE LAW (May 13, 2020) [hereinafter Quarantine
and the Limits of Government], https://www.law.uci.edu/news/videos/goodwin-covidquarantine-government.html [https://perma.cc/NM3Z-EC7X].
228
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 55–57 (1985).
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Hippocrates, who recommended a forty-day period of isolation to
determine the acuteness of a disease and limit its transmission.229
History is replete with examples of government-imposed
quarantines. The Bible describes quarantine measures imposed
by governmental authorities during ancient times.230 In the
Byzantine Empire, Emperor Justinian I (r. 527-565 CE) issued
edicts to prevent travel from regions afflicted by bouts of bubonic
plague.231 There are numerous examples of quarantine structures
being instituted throughout the Middle Ages, and in the
fourteenth century, the maritime republics of Ragusa and Venice
established forty-day quarantines for travelers as official state
practice.232 From the seventeenth century on, quarantining
became a standard norm for governments in response to
epidemics.233 The twentieth century saw the rise of national and
international bodies to monitor and research the spread of
diseases, resulting in greater surveillance of infected populations
as well as adjustments to the traditional forty-day quarantine to
meet different public health crises, such as the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (“SARS”).234 It is therefore longstanding
state practice to take extraordinary measures that restrict
persons’ rights during public health crises.
2.

U.S. Judicial Precedent and Public Health Powers: Jacobson
v. Massachusetts

While quarantines are perhaps the best-known example of
inherent powers over public health, U.S. legal understanding of
public health regulation by the state developed gradually, as it did
with inherent powers. As described previously, inherent powers
have been cited at a number of key points in American history; this

229

A.A. Conti, Quarantine Through History, in INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
HEALTH 454, 455 (Harald Kristian Heggenhougen ed., 1st ed. 2008).
230
See id. (citing Leviticus 13).
231
Id. at 456; see also WILLIAM ROSEN, JUSTINIAN’S FLEA: THE FIRST GREAT
PLAGUE AND THE END OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 214 (2008).
232
Conti, supra note 229, at 456; see also Eugenia Tognotti, Lessons from the
History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A, 19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 254, 255 (2013). For a thorough discussion on the Republic of Venice’s role
in the adoption of quarantines and other public health measures more broadly in
Western Europe, see MEREDITH F. SMALL, INVENTING THE WORLD: VENICE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION ch. 5 (2020).
233
Conti, supra note 229, at 457–59.
234
Id. at 460.
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is also true in the public health context.235 The federal government
enacted its first quarantine law in 1796,236 and in Gibbons v.
Ogden, the Supreme Court recognized inherent state police powers
to compel isolation and quarantine “to provide for the health of its
citizens,” despite the fact that these deprive citizens of certain
rights.237 That rule in Gibbons v. Ogden was given its corollary
nearly a century later, when the federal role in quarantines was
partially elucidated. In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a
Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, the Supreme Court
ruled that states can quarantine individuals and goods, even if
they involve interstate or foreign commerce—provided that
Congress has not created its own quarantine.238
Three years later, in the seminal public health law case of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court explicitly recognized that
constitutional liberties do not create an absolute right to be free
from restraint.239
Instead, the Court reasoned that the
Constitution guarantees “liberty regulated by law,” and in
situations of necessity, the “safety, health, peace, good order, and
morals of the community” must overrule the individual enjoyment
of liberty.240 Under this rationale, the Jacobson Court ruled that
a state could impose a fine upon someone who “refused to obey the
statute [to vaccinate against smallpox] and the regulation adopted
in execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health
and the public safety, confessedly endangered by the presence of a
dangerous disease.”241 The Court noted that it would only step in
where there was “a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law” which lacks a real or substantial nexus to
the “public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”242

235
Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers,
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01
/presidential-emergency-powers/576418/ [https://perma.cc/3GM7-A9JG].
236
Parmet, supra note 228, at 57.
237
22 U.S. 1, 205 (1824); see also Parmet, supra note 228, at 57 (placing Gibbons
v. Ogden in the historical context of quarantines under U.S. law).
238
186 U.S. 380, 387 (1902) (“[U]ntil Congress has exercised its power on the
subject, such state quarantine laws and state laws for the purpose of preventing,
eradicating, or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases, are not
repugnant to the Constitution.”). One can query whether a federal quarantine for
COVID-19 would be upheld under the Commerce Clause, for which there is at least
some support. See supra note 14.
239
197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
240
Id. at 26–27.
241
Id. at 12, 39.
242
Id. at 31.
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In the following years, the rule from Jacobson was upheld.
During the 1918 influenza pandemic, closings of businesses,
churches, and schools and prohibiting large gatherings were
upheld.243 In the mid-twentieth century, gathering places were
periodically closed in response to polio outbreaks.244 When the
different levels of government had to confront HIV in the late
twentieth century, legal scholars thought that the decision in
Jacobson would be read as too submissive by courts.245 Indeed,
health law scholar Larry Gostin thought that depriving an
individual of personal liberty like in 1905 would likely be held
unconstitutional if it was heard by today’s courts.246 But the
solutions that Gostin and other legal scholars recommended for
public health measures were not so different from those
articulated by the Supreme Court in Jacobson.247 Gostin and
others sought a balance of individual rights and public health
emergency powers.248 The Jacobson Court similarly tried to strike
a balance and noted that it would not permit arbitrary
infringement of individual rights.249 As the Seventh Circuit
recently noted, impliedly accepting this balance, “vaccination
requirements, like other public-health measures, have been
common in this nation.”250
During COVID-19 litigation, Jacobson has been cited
repeatedly to support public health measures by state
governors.251 At least some circuit and district courts have also
approvingly cited to Jacobson, with the Fifth Circuit, for example,
stating that “Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights may
be reasonably restricted to combat a public health emergency.”252
243
Lindsay F. Wiley, Democratizing the Law of Social Distancing, 19 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 50, 63–64 (2020).
244
Id. at 64.
245
Id.
246
Larry Gostin, The Future of Communicable Disease Control: Toward a New
Concept in Public Health Law, 83 MILBANK Q. 1, 8 (2005), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com
/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2005.00433.x [https://perma.cc/56TW-4YCT].
247
Wiley, supra note 243, at 64–65.
248
Id.
249
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
250
Klaasen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021).
251
Lawrence O. Gostin, Wendy E. Parmet & Sara Rosenbaum, Health Policy in
the Supreme Court and a New Conservative Majority, 324 JAMA 2157, 2158 (2020)
(“So far, most courts have rejected challenges to emergency orders, relying on the
Court’s landmark decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.”).
252
In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 786 (5th Cir. 2020), vacated as moot sub nom.,
Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021); see also In re
Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1028 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding that “the district court’s failure
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The Supreme Court appeared to endorse this approach in its May
2020 decision in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom,
in which the California executive order against large gatherings
at religious institutions was upheld.253
Critically, in his
concurrence, Chief Justice John Roberts explicitly endorsed the
wisdom of Jacobson.254 The Court ruled similarly in its July 2020
decision in Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, in which the
Court denied an application for injunctive relief by a Nevada
church that wanted to operate worship services exceeding the
public health restrictions instituted by the Nevada government.255
However, in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
decided in November 2020, the Supreme Court granted injunctive
relief for religious institutions in New York that had been subject
to Governor Andrew Cuomo’s executive order that restricted
attendance at religious services.256
But this shift in Roman Catholic Diocese does not mean that
Jacobson is dead; far from it. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Gorsuch noted that Jacobson is “essentially . . . rational basis
review,” again acknowledging that Jacobson strikes a balance
between rights and the public good.257 One of the major differences
pointed to between the two cases was the replacement of Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, shifting a
key vote on the court.258 Yet in August 2021, Justice Barrett
to apply the Jacobson framework produced a patently erroneous result”); Klaasen, 7
F.4th at 593 (rejecting a substantive due process claim because “vaccination
requirements, like other public-health measures, have been common in this nation”);
Harris v. Univ. of Massachusetts, No. 21-cv-11244, 2021 WL 3848012, at *6 (D. Mass.
Aug. 27, 2021) (“[T]he Supreme Court has ‘settled that it is within the police power of
a state to provide for compulsory vaccination.’ ” (quoting Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174,
176 (1922))). See also Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 957 F.3d 1171, 1183 (11th Cir. 2020)
(holding that “the district court [correctly] applied both the Jacobson framework and
the Casey undue-burden test” in preliminarily enjoining Alabama's mandate
postponing all non-emergency medical procedures during the COVID-19 pandemic,
includeing abortions).
253
140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020).
254
Id. at 1613–14.
255
See 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020); see also id. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing “that courts should be very deferential to the States’ linedrawing in opening businesses and allowing certain activities during the pandemic”).
256
141 S. Ct. 63, 65–66 (2020) (per curiam).
257
Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But see S. Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 718–20 (2021) (statement of Gorsuch, J.) (arguing that a
non-narrowly tailored prohibition on singing and chanting during indoor services did
not meet strict scrutiny, but not directly connecting the interest to Jacobson).
258
See Adam Liptak, Splitting 5 to 4, Supreme Court Backs Religious Challenge
to Cuomo’s Virus Shutdown Order, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2021),
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summarily rejected an emergency request to stop Indiana
University’s vaccine mandate,259 and below, the Seventh Circuit
favorably cited Jacobson in reaching that conclusion, strongly
supporting the notion that Jacobson is alive and well.260
Another important point in why Roman Catholic Diocese was
decided the way it was is that the executive orders at issue in all
three cases singled out places of worship rather than just being a
blanket prohibition against large gatherings.261 In all three of
these cases, the singling out of houses of worship implicated the
First Amendment guarantee of religious liberty.262 In the New
York case, houses of worship were explicitly treated differently,
with the number of attendees being capped at a certain number
rather than as a percentage based on overall capacity, as was the
case for many businesses.263 The Supreme Court explicitly noted
that the restrictions in the New York case were far more onerous

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/26/us/supreme-court-coronavirus-religion-newyork.html (noting that Justice Barrett played a decisive role in the outcome of the
case).
259
Amy Howe, Barrett Leaves Indiana University’s Vaccine Mandate in Place,
SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 12, 2021, 9:40 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/08/barrettleaves-indiana-universitys-vaccine-mandate-in-place [https://perma.cc/P6QY-ZMX4]
(suggesting that Justice Barrett not referring this question to the entire Court meant
that the Supreme Court did not find this to be a particularly contentious question).
260
Klaasen v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Given
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which holds that a state may require all members of the
public to be vaccinated against smallpox, there can’t be a constitutional problem with
vaccination against SARS-CoV-2.”) (citation omitted).
261
See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“California has now limited attendance at religious worship services to
25% of building capacity or 100 attendees, whichever is lower.”); Calvary Chapel
Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[The
Governor of Nevada] has issued a directive that severely limits attendance at religious
services. A church, synagogue, or mosque, regardless of its size, may not admit more
than 50 persons, but casinos and certain other favored facilities may admit 50% of
their maximum occupancy . . . .”); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 65–66 (“Both applications seek relief from an Executive Order issued by the Governor of
New York that imposes very severe restrictions on attendance at religious services in
areas classified as ‘red’ or ‘orange’ zones.”).
262
See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring); Cavalry Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2604 (Alito, J., dissenting); Roman Cath.
Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 66.
263
Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 66 (“In red zones, no more than
10 persons may attend each religious service, and in orange zones, attendance is
capped at 25. . . . In a red zone, while a synagogue or church may not admit more than
10 persons, businesses categorized as ‘essential’ may admit as many people as they
wish. . . . The disparate treatment is even more striking in an orange zone. While
attendance at houses of worship is limited to 25 persons, even non-essential
businesses may decide for themselves how many persons to admit.”).
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than those in the California and Nevada cases.264 Blanket orders
that apply the same rules equally to all gatherings would appear
to bypass this First Amendment challenge. Even if the First
Amendment religious liberty right has been strengthened by
Justice Barrett’s addition to the Supreme Court, there is still a
strong ground for restricting religious freedoms under public
health inherent powers pursuant to Jacobson as long as the
restrictions are not specifically targeted at houses of worship.
Indeed, this approach was reinforced by a trio of Supreme Court
decisions in the first half of 2021. In South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, the Supreme Court granted in part an
application for injunctive relief against California’s COVID
measures that prohibited indoor religious services, while other
provisions of the law were not enjoined because they were applied
in a “generally applicable manner.”265 The Court then endorsed
this approach in its brief opinion in Gateway City Church v.
Newsom.266 Finally, in its most comprehensive discussion, the
Supreme Court in Tandon v. Newsom held that California’s
restrictions on private gatherings contained numerous exceptions
for secular activities, but not for religious ones, and were therefore
“not neutral and generally applicable” and triggered strict
scrutiny.267 The Court succinctly noted that “[t]he State cannot
‘assume the worst when people go to worship but assume the best
when people go to work.’ ”268
As suggested by these recent Supreme Court decisions,
Jacobson is not an absolute privilege for governments to override
personal freedoms in the name of public health. In one article,
constitutional law professor Josh Blackman criticized modern
usages of Jacobson, arguing that Jacobson should be interpreted
as the law stood in 1905.269 Blackman argued that Jacobson was
written before modern tests of rational basis and heightened
scrutiny for due process had been articulated and the Bill of Rights
had not yet been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment to

264
Id. (citing S. Bay United Pentecostal Church, 140 S. Ct. at 1613, and Cavalry
Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2603) (“They are far more restrictive than any COVID–related
regulations that have previously come before the Court . . . .”).
265
141 S. Ct. 716 (2021).
266
141 S. Ct. 1460 (2021).
267
141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296–97 (2021).
268
Id. at 1297 (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)).
269
Josh Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 70 BUFF.
L. REV. 131, 153 (2021).
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apply to states.270 In particular, Blackman notes that Jacobson
should not permit the overriding of constitutional fundamental
rights, particularly those in the Bill of Rights, as such laws are
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.271 Similarly to Blackman,
Professors Lindsay F. Wiley and Stephen I. Vladeck argue that
judicial review of civil liberties is necessary during public health
emergencies to prevent “gross violations of civil rights.”272 In a preCOVID article, Ben Horowitz also advocated for narrowing
Jacobson by utilizing strict scrutiny to protect the purported right
to refuse vaccination, although he concluded that the government
could craft vaccine mandates that would meet strict scrutiny even
absent Jacobson.273 Yet Supreme Court cases have largely failed
to address how Jacobson—or inherent powers over public health
more broadly—square against specific fundamental rights.274 And
Jacobson itself addresses some of Blackman’s concerns: it provides
that Jacobson does not grant an absolute privilege and that abuse
or enforced vaccination of an individual too unfit to be vaccinated
would likely be barred by law.275
Instead of being focused on individual rights, Jacobson is
more accurately interpreted as a continuation of the recognition of
inherent powers over public health. The language of Jacobson
specifically invokes the public health of the community and holds
it above individual liberty, noting that it is not acceptable for the
individual to “endanger[ ] [the community] by the presence of a
dangerous disease.”276 Indeed, these powers have allowed the
restriction of important U.S. rights, such as freedom of movement
under the millennia-old practice of quarantining. Jacobson does
270

Id. at 142.
Id. at 149 (stating that courts should not apply the presumption of
constitutionality when reviewing legislation that “ ‘appears on its face’ to violate ‘a
specific prohibition of the Constitution’ ”) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
272
Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and the
Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 179,
183 (2020).
273
Ben Horowitz, Comment, A Shot in the Arm: What a Modern Approach to
Jacobson v. Massachusetts Means for Mandatory Vaccinations During a Public Health
Emergency, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1715, 1730–40 (2011).
274
Blackman examines what little jurisprudence has been issued for Jacobson
and the First and Second Amendments, as well as the right to abortion, but Jacobson
is examined in little detail in these cases and, as Blackman admits, usually used for
a different purpose than the actual holding. See generally Blackman, supra note 269,
at 190–267.
275
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
276
Id.
271
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not offer carte blanche authority to override fundamental rights,
but recent COVID-19 Supreme Court cases appear to have
endorsed the view that the case suggests broader inherent powers
over public health that allow the neutral restriction of acts for the
benefit of public health, such as mandates to wear masks in public
spaces.277
3.

U.S. Emergency Powers During Public Health Crises

In addition to case precedent, Congress has also granted the
President greater powers in the face of public health crises, such
as by explicitly authorizing the President to deploy military
personnel when civilian authorities are overwhelmed, including
during a health quarantine.278 The Public Health Service Act of
1994 grants the executive branch unilateral authorization to
declare a national emergency, as well as broad discretion during a
public health emergency to investigate the cause or treatment of a
disease, enter into public health-related contracts, or impose a
quarantine.279 President Obama, for example, used the Public
Health Service Act to declare a public health emergency for the
H1N1 pandemic in 2009.280 Similarly, in response to an influenza
pandemic in 2005, President George W. Bush released the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, setting forth
distribution protocols for limited amounts of vaccines and antiviral
medication.281 President Trump also used the Public Health
Service Act to declare a public health emergency for COVID-19 in
2020.282 This state of emergency has been repeatedly renewed
under both the Trump and Biden administrations.283

277

See Quarantine and the Limits of Government, supra note 227 (discussing the
legality of quarantines under current U.S. law).
278
10 U.S.C. § 252 (2016).
279
Friedman, supra note 204, at 299–300.
280
Declaration of a National Emergency with Respect to the 2009 H1N1 Influenza
Pandemic, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 24, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/realitycheck/the-press-office/declaration-a-national-emergency-with-respect-2009-h1n1influenza-pandemic-0 [https://perma.cc/BMP2-S47P].
281
HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC
INFLUENZA IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2006), https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemicresources/pdf/pandemic-influenza-strategy-2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/RWJ6-NLU4].
282
President Trump Declares State of Emergency for COVID-19, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publicationsand-resources/president-trump-declares-state-of-emergency-for-covid-19.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7GSM-VTD6].
283
See Xavier Becerra, Renewal of Determination That a Public Health Emergency
Exists, (July 19, 2021) https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/
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Emergency legislation has been passed on a wide range of
aspects related to public health emergencies, including controlling
communicable diseases, preventing the introduction and spread of
foreign diseases and domestic diseases interstate, establishing
quarantine rules and penalties for violations of those rules,
preventing non-citizens with communicable diseases from
entering the country, and grounding or cancelling air travel into
the country, among others.284 Legal scholar Joshua L. Friedman
stressed that among the most important duties of the executive
branch during public health crises are protecting the public by
encouraging vaccination, testing, treatment, isolation, and
quarantine,
and
authoritatively
and
unambiguously
285
communicating about the crisis with the public.
Scholars have defended extraordinary decisions by the federal
government to act in the face of public health crises, following in
the vein of the Supreme Court decision in Jacobson. Friedman
concluded that there are no circumstances “more necessary or
imminent than in a public health emergency scenario, where the
smallest delay can cause extensive loss of life.”286 Law professor
George P. Smith, II, identified a focus on “benefiting society at
large” as a primary factor in taking public health actions.287 He
stressed the necessity of acquiescence to the restriction of civil
liberties during public health crises, as failure to do so “courts the
collapse of society itself.”288 Friedman took Smith's statement to
its logical conclusion: “To prevent losses of this magnitude, the
Executive may be required to approve the infringement of
individual liberties in order to immediately safeguard the lives of
the many.”289

Pages/COVID-19July2021.aspx [https://perma.cc/KGW4-V74R] (“I, Xavier Becerra,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the authority vested in me
under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby renew, effective July 20,
2021, the January 31, 2020, determination by former Secretary Alex M. Azar II, that
he previously renewed on April 21, 2020, July 23, 2020, October 2, 2020, and January
7, 2021, and that I renewed on April 15, 2021, that a public health emergency
exists . . . .”).
284
Friedman, supra note 204, at 301.
285
Id. at 302.
286
Id. at 296.
287
George P. Smith, II, Re-shaping the Common Good in Times of Public Health
Emergencies: Validating Medical Triage, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 15 (2009).
288
Id. at 34.
289
Friedman, supra note 204, at 303 (emphasis added).
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Censoring of Speech During Wartime

Perhaps the most apt comparison for restricting free speech in
extraordinary circumstances is the censoring of free speech during
times of war. Censorship has been a long-standing practice of
governments, from ancient Greece through today.290 In the United
States, freedom of speech is one of the most sacred of rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.291 Yet during times of war, the
need for authority and victory have rivaled or even outweighed
individual civil liberties.292 This U.S. practice matches the
international trend, which includes more restrictive censorship
during times of war.293 For example, Great Britain censored free
speech during World War I and World War II; in fact, widespread
censorship was the norm in every military combatant country.294
U.S. law on wartime censorship has changed considerably
since the founding of the United States. Briefly recounting the
history of censorship in the United States is essential to
understanding the possibilities for censorship of fake news in the
public health context today. The Sedition Act of 1798, instituted
during the so-called “ ‘Half War’ with France,” prohibited the
publication of “any false, scandalous[,] and malicious writing”
against the government.295 The Act was defended on the basis of
seditious agents endangering “the very existence of the nation”
through “fomenting hostilities.”296 Although the Supreme Court
never ruled on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act, in 1840,
Congress noted that the Act had been a “mistaken exercise” and
was “null[ ] and void.”297 The Supreme Court went on to categorize
the Act as being held unconstitutional “in the court of history.”298

290
Mette Newth, The Long History of Censorship, BEACON FOR FREEDOM (2010),
http://www.beaconforfreedom.org/liste.html?tid=415&art_id=475
[https://perma.cc/72GM-KJEC].
291
See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM
THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 5–7, 14 (2004).
292
See DANIEL C. HALLIN, THE “UNCENSORED WAR”: THE MEDIA AND VIETNAM
215 (1986) (asserting that “every society must maintain a balance between democracy
and authority”).
293
Newth, supra note 290.
294
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295
An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch.
74, §§ 2, 4, 1 Stat. 596, 596–97 (1798) (expired 1801); Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech
and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 940–41 (2009).
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Yet similar laws were passed throughout U.S. history. During
the Civil War, President Lincoln took several extraordinary
measures due to the risk the Civil War posed to the Union, such
as suspending habeas corpus, as previously mentioned.299 In the
area of free speech, the most famous case was that of Clement
Vallandigham, a leader of the Copperheads—Union Democrats
who wanted immediate peace—who gave a speech in 1863 to an
audience 15,000 strong on how the war was “wicked, cruel, and
unnecessary,” and Vallandigham urged those present to vote
President Lincoln out of office.300 He was ultimately convicted of
“declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and
purpose of weakening the power of the government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion.”301 Despite criticism, President
Lincoln defended the decision on the basis of preventing “further
injury to the [Union] military.”302
In 1917, “[s]hortly after the United States entered [World War
I], Congress enacted the Espionage Act . . . .”303 This was the first
federal legislation since the Sedition Act of 1798 to expressly
criminalize disloyal expression.304 The Act made it a crime to
“willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States” or “obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of
the United States.”305 Prosecutors and federal judges soon
expanded the Act to include any criticism of war.306 The Supreme
Court consistently upheld the convictions of anti-war dissenters
under the Act.307 As legal scholar Harry Kalven, Jr., concluded,
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Stone, supra note 295, at 943.
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Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219.
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Stone, supra note 295, at 944–45.
307
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 333 (1920) (“[E]very word that he uttered
in denunciation of the war was false, was deliberate misrepresentation of the motives
which impelled it, and the objects for which it was prosecuted.”); Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239, 252 (1920) (rejecting a critical interpretation of the Act because
that interpretation “would allow the professed advocate of disloyalty to escape
responsibility for statements however audaciously false”); Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466, 481 (1920) (“[I]ts statements were deliberate and willfully false; the
purpose being to represent that the war was not demanded by the people but was the
result of the machinations of executive power . . . .”); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (“[T]he defendants, in terms, plainly urged and advocated a resort
to a general strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of curtailing
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these Court decisions contained the clear message that “[w]hile
the nation is at war, serious, abrasive criticism . . . is beyond
constitutional protection.”308
Following World War I, First Amendment protections grew in
the face of national security concerns. During World War II,
although the Espionage Act remained on the books, the Attorneys
General that served under President Franklin D. Roosevelt
discouraged prosecuting subversive activities and indeed
dismissed charges when they occurred.309 When William Dudley
Pelley, a major American fascist leader, was prosecuted under the
Espionage Act, he was charged with making “false statements”
rather than disloyalty, which had been the asserted charge in the
prosecutions during World War I.310
After World War II, in the midst of the Cold War, both the
infamous House Committee on Un-American Activities (“HUAC”)
and the Communist Control Act of 1954 restricted free speech by
communists.311 In Dennis v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld the conviction of leaders of the American Communist
Party, holding that the violent overthrow of government is an
overriding concern that did not violate the First Amendment.312 In
subsequent decisions, the Court upheld investigations of
“ ‘subversive’ organizations and individuals” and the systematic
freezing out of the Communist Party.313
By the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court started to reel
back these broad powers of Congress, limiting the power to
investigate and publicly discriminate on the basis of political

the production of ordnance and munitions necessary and essential to the prosecution
of the war as is charged in the fourth count.”); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S.
204, 209 (1919) (“The overt acts are alleged to have been done to effect the object of
the conspiracy and that is sufficient under section 4 of the Act of 1917.”); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war many things that
might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right.”); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216
(1919) (“Without going into further particulars we are of opinion that the verdict on
the fourth count, for obstructing and attempting to obstruct the recruiting service of
the United States, must be sustained.”).
308
HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA
147 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988).
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affiliation.314 In 1969, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court
overturned Dennis, holding that states cannot punish advocacy of
unlawful conduct alone, unless it is intended and likely to incite
“imminent lawless action.”315 Meanwhile, beginning in the 1950s,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) operated its Counter
Intelligence Program (“COINTELPRO”), which engaged in
extralegal harassment and infiltration of dissenting political
organizations.316 But in 1976, when these activities were revealed,
they were condemned by both congressional committees and the
Attorney General.317
This trend of increased First Amendment rights appeared to
face a setback in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, when President Bush “claimed far-reaching powers” to meet
the crisis.318 Immediately after the attacks, Americans were
indeed more willing to accept encroachments on their civil liberties
for the good of national security.319 Attorney General John
Ashcroft authorized the FBI to once again “monitor political and
religious activities.”320 But compared to previous eras, the
restrictions on free speech had relaxed significantly; unlike during
World Wars I and II, the government did not prosecute any
individuals for criticizing the war.321
Constitutional law scholar Geoffrey Stone has argued that the
United States has significantly progressed in allowing the full
range of free speech during wartime.322 He also critiques historical
restrictions that were justified on the “perceived danger of
wartime,” castigating them as “overreactions.”323 As shown in this
section, it is undoubtedly true that courts and the government’s
314
See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 (1967) (limiting restrictions on
public employment due to political affiliation or beliefs); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.,
381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965) (prohibiting restrictions on mailing communist political
propaganda); Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557–58 (1963)
(limiting ability of legislative committees to investigate political beliefs).
315
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
316
Stone, supra note 295, at 952.
317
Id.
318
Id. at 953.
319
Id.
320
Id. at 954; see also JOHN ASHCROFT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES
ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE
INVESTIGATIONS 21–22 (2002), https://epic.org/privacy/fbi/FBI-2002-Guidelines.pdf [
https://perma.cc/XS9V-TQQ7] (authorizing specific proactive counterterrorism
monitoring strategies and practices).
321
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acceptance of restricting free speech during wartime has
decreased precipitously. Yet some legal scholars have emphasized
that there is a traceable historical practice of censorship during
war which can be applied to new challenges.324 However, these
historical examples still show an overarching theme:
constitutional rights, even free speech, can be overcome during
times of national emergencies by countervailing interests.325 Even
if the level of acceptable restrictions is much less than those under
the Sedition or Espionage Acts, courts have provided a precedent
for restricting speech in circumstances such as public health
crises.
IV. INHERENT POWERS AS A LIMIT ON PUBLIC HEALTH FAKE
NEWS
Having laid the necessary groundwork on inherent powers in
the previous section, this Part will now address the issue at bar:
whether the federal government can restrict patently false
information about COVID-19 in a manner consistent with the
First Amendment. This is a novel question in U.S. law that has
thus far not been addressed in scholarly literature or by the courts.
However, a framework for a public health fake news carveout from
the First Amendment emerges from the related precedents and
scholarship on inherent and emergency powers that were
discussed in the previous section. First, this Part will address why
traditional First Amendment concerns are a poor fit for false
information about COVID-19. Then, having shown a lower need
for protecting this speech, this section will continue by showing
how the restriction of COVID-19 fake news is a strong fit for all
three models of inherent powers recognized in the United States:
(1) long-standing practice by nations, (2) powers necessary or
incidental to constitutionally enumerated powers, and (3)
emergency situations.

324

See, e.g., Melissa J. Morgans, Note, Freedom of Speech, the War on Terror, and
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First Amendment Weaknesses with COVID-19 Fake News

As explained in Part II, false statements are protected under
the First Amendment.326 The traditional rationales for why false
information should be justified are the marketplace of ideas and
counterspeech.
But, as also explained in Part II, these
justifications have been increasingly criticized in the context of
fake news in legal scholarship.327 In relation to fake news
surrounding COVID-19, these justifications are weaker and
countervailing interests in favor of speech restrictions are
stronger.
The purpose of the marketplace of ideas has been subject to
considerable debate. As law and computer science professor Ari
Ezra Waldman has argued, the marketplace of ideas is about the
circulation of different ideas and opinions.328 Prior critiques of
censorship were related to opinions; however, fake news is about
facts.329 The marketplace of ideas is not intended to be a
marketplace of alternative facts.330 Yet the seminal cases are a bit
more mixed. In Abrams, Justice Holmes noted that the courts
should be “vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions.”331 Yet both Justice Holmes, in Abrams, and Justice
Brandeis, in Whitney, stressed that the marketplace of ideas was
the “best test of truth” and “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is
good ones.”332 These statements implicate counterspeech as the
necessary tonic for false information.
Counterspeech is a worthy constraint on the spread of false
information if the proper conditions exist. As Justice Brandeis
argued in Whitney, “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more free speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.”333
Justice Holmes similarly stated that the First Amendment is
subject to limitation only when there is an “emergency that makes
it immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to

326

See supra notes 61–68 and accompanying text.
Napoli, supra note 73, at 61–63; Waldman, supra note 12, at 848.
328
Waldman, supra note 12, at 848.
329
Id.
330
Id.
331
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
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time.”334 The lack of proper conditions, especially in an emergency
situation, as Justice Brandeis noted, can justify restrictions on
freedom of speech. In the case of false information, law professor
Eugene Volokh found Justice Brandeis’ extolling of counterspeech
lacking: “Perhaps the counterspeech might undo some of the harm,
but it seems quite unlikely that it will undo all or even most of
it.”335 Even Supreme Court precedent has acknowledged that false
statements deserve less First Amendment protection than true
ones, even if only in the context of legally cognizable harms.336
COVID-19 poses a special challenge to these justifications due
to the changed nature of the spread of information, access to the
marketplace, and the type of information that is being debated.
The main purpose of the marketplace of ideas is to allow different
opinions and ideas to circulate in the public.337 When Justices
Holmes and Brandeis were discussing the marketplace of ideas,
they were rendering their judicial opinions in a time before the
Internet or social media.338 Information traveled relatively slowly
and access to public forums were limited.339 In 2020, the landscape
of information access and promulgation has transformed
practically beyond recognition.
Almost anyone can spread

334
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information by themself over the Internet.340 While Justices
Holmes and Brandeis envisioned open discussions of new ideas,341
there is no evidence that they envisioned the type of spread of
“alternative facts” that exists in the contemporary United
States.342
But these challenges, while significant, are issues with fake
news in general. Fake news in relation to COVID-19 poses
especially poignant problems. Public health information is
undoubtedly of prime importance to the U.S. populace.343 There is
little value of including patently false information about health in
the marketplace of ideas.344 False information relating to COVID19 will only cause harm through the spread and improper
treatment of the coronavirus. Justices Holmes and Brandeis’
standard for restricting free speech is met here: it is dangerous to
leave this deadly false information in the public space to be
corrected by the passage of time when the virus kills in real time.
The spread of incorrect information about the danger of the virus
and the importance of social distancing measures has already
contributed to the hundreds of thousands of COVID-19 deaths in
the United States.345 If there is little value to false COVID-19
information, the countervailing public interest in public health
may outweigh the need for First Amendment protection. Even if
the robust marketplace of ideas and counterspeech that the
Supreme Court has endorsed for nearly a century are intact, false
COVID-19 information is at the outer extreme of even this broad
reading of the First Amendment and its rationales, given the
obvious harms such circulation could cause and the problems with
letting counterspeech play out at its natural, slower speed. Given
this reality, First Amendment rationales would likely, at the very
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least, be weaker for fake COVID-19 information than they are for
more traditional free speech concerns related to politics or beliefs.
Given that the First Amendment is likely less robust in
protecting fake news related to COVID-19, there is a lower bar to
using inherent powers to restrict the promulgation of COVID-19
fake news. This makes available to the government an avenue of
regulation through inherent powers. In the following sections, this
Article will explain how the restriction of fake COVID-19 news is
an untested but strong match for all three models of inherent
federal powers.
B.

Long-Standing International Practice

As described in detail in Part III.B., the international
community and the United States, in particular, have had a long
history of expanded governmental powers in the area of public
health.346 The problem of widespread fake COVID-19 news is a
novel issue in the international community, yet the precedent of
inherent powers in public health, in general, provides substantial
justification for similar restrictions on civil liberties in the face of
fake news that threatens public health.
The populace of any country depends on the government to
maintain public health.347 Protection from disease is dependent on
overarching control of a disparate populace to act for the greater
good of public health.348 The practice of quarantining one’s
population to restrict the spread of disease, even at the loss of civil
liberties, is a national power stretching back millennia.349 Today,
there is undoubtedly international understanding that
governments have extraordinary powers to act in the best
interests of public health. Many treaties draw explicit exceptions
for public health purposes. The World Trade Organization’s
(“WTO”) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
346
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Rights (“TRIPS”), for example, have exceptions that allow the
adoption of otherwise infringing trade measures that are
“necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health”350 or
that are “necessary to protect public health.”351 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) also provides
that “[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation . . . States Parties . . . may take measures derogating from
their obligations under the present Covenant.”352 The ICCPR
explicitly states that the right to freedom of expression and
freedom of speech may be restricted “[f]or the protection of
national security or of public order . . . or of public health or
morals.”353 So a country can breach its usual international
obligations, including the obligation to provide the right of freedom
of speech for its citizens, if a public health necessity exists. In
terms of COVID-19 specifically, the WHO called for countries to
staunch the spread of fake news due to the considerable risk of
aggravating the COVID-19 pandemic.354
This international trend to allow the restriction of civil
liberties to protect public health has been reflected in U.S. law.
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the government
has substantial power to assure Americans’ health.355 Since at
least Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824, the Supreme Court has implied
that states have inherent powers to safeguard the public’s
health.356 In the nineteenth century, courts generally allowed the
government to engage in whichever actions they thought were best
for preserving public health.357 In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the
Supreme Court stressed that citizens have duties to one another,
350
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(I)(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 64
U.N.T.S. 187; General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV(b), Apr. 15, 1994,
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352
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4(1), Dec. 19, 1966,
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implying that actions should be taken for the greater societal
good.358 The Jacobson Court also held that individual liberties
could be restrained in the interests of public health.359
But the Jacobson Court also placed limits on the government’s
public health powers, requiring that they be carried out in
conformity with the four principles of public health: necessity,
reasonable means, proportionality, and harm avoidance.360 This
limitation was implicitly reaffirmed in the three 2020 Supreme
Court rulings on COVID-19 restrictions: South Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, Cavalry Chapel Dayton Valley v.
Sisolak, and Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo.361
Restrictions on COVID-19 fake news that are not applied equally
or are extremely vague could be struck down.362 A former version
of Puerto Rico’s law prohibiting fake news363—so far the sole
example of such a law in the United States—could have been
overruled for being overbroad or overly vague.364 The law
prohibited sharing fake news about emergencies in Puerto Rico,
including COVID-19, but referred to emergencies broadly and left
undefined the key terms “non-existing abnormalities” and
“confusion.”365 In July 2020, the government of Puerto Rico revised
the law, restricting it to prohibiting
[g]iv[ing] a warning or false alarm, knowing that the information
is false, in relation to the imminent occurrence of a catastrophe
in Puerto Rico, or disseminat[ing] . . . a notice or a false alarm,
knowing that the information is false, when as a result of its
conduct it puts the life, health, bodily integrity or safety of one or

358
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more persons at imminent risk, or endangers public or private
property.366

While this law is still a broad prohibition on fake news, it is more
narrowly tailored than the previous version and stands a better
chance of surviving litigation.
The decision in Jacobson reflects an important principle that
is also reflected in international custom: proportionality. A slight
risk to public health would likely not justify a substantial
restriction on civil liberties or a violation of international
obligations.367 Therefore, there is, in practice, a balancing test that
weighs the public health necessity against individual rights. Such
a test addresses the concerns of Justice Jackson in Youngstown, in
which he worried that emergency powers would breed
emergencies.368 This test creates a viable route that balances
public health and individual liberties, both for Congress and the
Presidency, rather than creating a balancing system between the
two branches like Justice Jackson did in Youngstown.369
As described in Part I, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented
an unprecedented public health challenge in the United States.370
As Justice Jackson noted in Youngstown, inherent powers are
strongest during the greatest crises.371 Historically, the U.S.
government has issued emergency orders restricting liberties in
the face of public health crises.372 Likewise, the U.S. government
declared a national emergency in response to COVID-19.373
Indeed, over half of the world’s democracies declared a state of
emergency.374 A tracker maintained by the International Center
for Not-For-Profit Law indicates that, by April 2022, 112 countries
366
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372

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:319

declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19
pandemic.375 In response to this unprecedented pandemic, most
people around the world have not challenged the medically sound
restrictions on freedom of assembly and freedom of movement, or
even the altruistic obligations to wear face masks.376 International
custom therefore permits certain restrictions of civil liberties due
to COVID-19.
Restrictions on fake news regarding COVID-19 would also
appear to fall squarely within this international custom.
Quarantines and restrictions on movement are directly correlated
to limiting the spread of the coronavirus—or “flattening the
curve”377—even though they constrain Americans' constitutional
rights. Restricting COVID-19 fake news would serve the same
purpose.
The proliferation of false information about the
coronavirus has decreased social distancing and led to
unnecessary further infections and deaths.378 Yet there is an
argument that restricting COVID-19 fake news is even better from
a legal standpoint than quarantining, which could be overbroad.
Freedom of movement and freedom of speech are both
constitutional rights, but quarantining restricts practically all
movement, no matter the purpose, while restricting fake news
about COVID-19 only restricts freedom of speech for patently false
information that would cause harm if it were allowed to circulate.
As explained in the previous section, there would appear to be a
strong countervailing public interest that arguably outweighs the
First Amendment interest in fake news about COVID-19.379
Better protecting the public during this unprecedented pandemic
by restricting the circulation of fake news about COVID-19 would,
therefore, be justified under existing international inherent

375
COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/?location=&issue=&date=&type=
[https://perma.cc/3RX7-MZMZ] (last visited Apr. 9, 2022).
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See id.
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Siobhan Roberts, Flattening the Coronavirus Curve, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/flatten-curve-coronavirus.html.
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See Kris Hartley & Vu Minh Khuong, Fighting Fake News in the COVID-19
Era: Policy Insights from an Equilibrium Model, 53 POL’Y SCIS. 735, 736 (2020) (“In
an illustrative episode from April 2020, the scientific community’s largely consensus
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challenged by protesters in the American states of Minnesota, Michigan, and Texas,
who demanded in rallies that governors immediately relax social distancing protocols
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powers practice and the balancing test from Jacobson for the
United States’ inherent powers surrounding public health.
C.

Powers Naturally Pursuant to Constitutionally Enumerated
Powers

The second ground for finding inherent powers after
international custom is to look for powers that are naturally
pursuant to those enumerated in the Constitution. While public
health is not directly addressed in the Constitution, it was likely
intended to be included by the Founders under providing for the
general welfare, and the broad reach of general welfare powers
would appear to include regulating fake news about COVID-19.
The U.S. Constitution does not directly say anything about
public health, yet it does mention the general welfare of the United
States at two separate points. First, in the preamble to the
Constitution, one of the reasons for establishing the United States
is listed as to “promote the general Welfare.”380 Then in Article I,
Section 8, the Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States . . . .”381 Although “general welfare” is quite
broad, it has been interpreted to give the federal government the
power to act to benefit public health,382 which naturally improves
the general welfare of the country.
As law professor Edward Richards has argued, the Founders
of the United States would have naturally understood that police
powers existed for public health purposes.383 The United States at
the end of the eighteenth century was rife with disease. As
Professor Richards describes, “[t]he major cities were on rivers at
or near the coast to have access to shipping and they were plagued
with disease-carrying mosquitoes. Sewage ran in the streets and
contaminated the drinking water wells. Shipping from foreign
ports brought a constant threat of epidemic disease.”384
380
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see also Gostin, supra note 347, at 276; Holt et al., supra note 347.
383
Eugene Volokh, The Coronavirus and the Constitution, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Feb. 10, 2020, 8:01 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/02/10/the-coronavirus-andthe-constitution [https://perma.cc/W9YY-9ZKX].
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Many of the Founders had suffered from or lost loved ones to
disease.385 The dangers of disease were well known in eighteenth
century America, so, from an original intent perspective, the
Founders undoubtedly intended to maintain these police powers
in the realm of public health in their new country.386
Furthermore, the Constitution does not place any limits on
the legal power to protect the public from disease.387 As held by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones, enumerated
restrictions in the Constitution, where they exist, act as
constraints on inherent powers.388 However, from a practical
standpoint, the means likely have to be proportional and
rationally related to the outcome.389 Restrictive measures that
have no basis in medical literature and practice would be beyond
the scope of what was intended by the founders.390 Thus, in acting
to benefit the general welfare through public health measures, a
similar balancing test to that in Jacobson emerges. Given this
similar result to international custom, the outcome would likely be
the same regarding the regulation of fake COVID-19 news.
Restricting false information about COVID-19 would contribute to
the general welfare through improving public health.
D. Emergency Situations
The final type of inherent powers are emergency powers that
only emerge during crises. There is long-standing practice in the
United States to declare national emergencies in the face of public
health crises, although historically these have been primarily
related to the restriction of movement rather than speech.391
Another emergency situation, war, provides a corollary for the
restriction of freedom of speech. The U.S. government has
declared a public health emergency due to COVID-19, and thus
the groundwork is already laid for a restriction of fake COVID-19
news through emergency powers.

385
386
387
388
389
390
391

Id.
Id.
Holt et al., supra note 347, at 2–3, 10.
109 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1883).
Holt et al., supra note 347, at 2.
See id.
See supra Part III.B.

2021]

THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC HEALTH FAKE NEWS

375

Since 2005, dozens of public health emergencies have been
declared under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act.392
Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services may take extraordinary actions if “(1) a disease
or disorder presents a public health emergency; or (2) a public
health emergency, including significant outbreaks of infectious
diseases or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists . . . .”393 Public
health emergencies have been declared in response to outbreaks
of epidemics and pandemics prior to COVID-19, such as during the
H1N1 Flu outbreak in 2009394 and in response to the outbreak of
Zika Virus in 2016.395
The Trump Administration similarly declared a public health
emergency for COVID-19 pursuant to Section 319, with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services announcing it on
January 31, 2020.396 President Trump followed this by issuing an
executive order declaring a national emergency due to COVID19.397 Both the Trump and Biden administrations have extended
this state of emergency.398 The powers claimed by the Trump and
Biden administrations during the national emergency are those
that were commonly exercised during prior public health crises
and are undoubtably inherent powers: quarantines, restrictions on
travel, and research support.399 Beyond these usual restrictions
on civil liberties, the Trump administration did not attempt to
claim any further emergency powers. The Biden administration’s
September executive order mandating vaccines for federal
employeesalso likely falls within these historic norms.400 The
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Biden administration's attempt to require businesses with 100 or
more employees to mandate vaccination or weekly testing through
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") Act
was halted by the Supreme Court,401 but it is unclear whether such
a mandate would have passed constitutional muster if it had relied
on inherent powers rather than a specific statute.
Restrictions on speech are possible through emergency powers
too. As described in Part III.C., censorship of speech during times
of military conflict has been a longstanding practice in the United
States and internationally, although it has grown increasingly less
robust over the course of the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries.402 The practice of wartime censorship presents an
important baseline principle for emergency powers. Censorship
was allowed due to the emergency situation in the United States,
which was embroiled in military conflicts that threatened the
security of the country. Yet limitations also accumulated over the
past century that restricted the extent of censorship that was
permissible. In cases during World Wars I and II, censorship of
political speech, which is highly protected under the First
Amendment, was allowed.403 Later, such draconian restrictions
were no longer attempted.404 This sets up a balancing system of
the emergency interest versus the interest in civil liberties.405 This
effectively creates a similar test to that used in Jacobson for
customary international inherent powers and as would be
understood through an original intent reading of the
Constitution’s general welfare clauses.
A comparison with the conflicting interests of wartime
censorship demonstrates that a restriction on fake COVID-19
news is likely to meet this bar for emergency powers. When the
U.S. government acts in the interests of public health, it frequently
must restrict personal or economic liberties of individuals.406
Furthermore, the collective good of public health is one of the
https://www.whitehouse.gov/covidplan (last visited Oct. 8, 2021) (presenting
President Biden’s proposed plan for countering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic); see
also Dershowitz, supra note 14 (explaining that “a properly enacted statute
mandating vaccination or conditioning employment and other benefits on vaccination
or testing would be upheld” as constitutional).
401
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utmost importance.407 Unlike wartime censorship, this emergency
power has not been weakened over time; the Trump
administration invoked the same quarantine and travel
restriction powers that have been invoked in the United States
since colonial times. Furthermore, the speech at stake with
wartime censorship was core political speech that the First
Amendment is designed to protect. Fake news about COVID-19,
even if it is clearly protected under the First Amendment following
the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Alvarez, should not
be as important given its more minor contributions—or even
complete lack of value—to U.S. society. 408 Indeed, fake COVID-19
news has actively harmed U.S. citizens by leading to poor public
health practices and greater rates of COVID-19 transmission and
deaths than in other countries. Given the greater governmental
interest in restricting fake COVID-19 news, the federal
government’s broad public health emergency powers should
permit restrictions on the circulation of false information related
to COVID-19 in a manner consistent with the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Until recently, inherent powers have been a neglected source
of constraints on fake news. Yet in the context of COVID-19,
inherent powers are a powerful model for restricting harmful fake
news about the coronavirus, public health measures, and vaccines.
The three models for inherent powers—international custom,
pursuant to constitutionally enumerated powers, and emergency
powers—are ultimately focused on balancing tests that weigh the
government’s necessity against the importance of the civil liberties
being restricted. Based on historic inherent powers related to
public health and the censorship of speech during wartime in both
the United States and other countries, restricting COVID-19 fake
news would appear to be a strong fit for inherent powers.
The use of inherent powers is not without risk. Broad
inherent and emergency powers could erode rights more
permanently, as happened historically in the United States with
sterilization a century ago409 and has more recently been the case
407
Id. at 321 (“Undoubtedly, personal autonomy, privacy, and liberty are
exceptionally important values. However, they do not necessarily trump the equally
important collective value of community health and wellbeing.”).
408
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in Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orban.410 But even if
courts have done an inadequate job of restraining the President’s
inherent powers in the past,411 the balancing tests identified in
Parts III and IV provide a model for how to constrain an
overgrowth of the federal government. Fake news about COVID19 poses a serious threat to the health of Americans.
Notwithstanding the self-regulation of some major online
platforms regarding fake news,412 the government can have a role
in regulating fake news in relation to public health. Governments
have always been the ultimate protector of society from public
health crises; the emergence of fake news as a novel threat to
public health does not change this long-standing precedent of
inherent powers.
The utilization of inherent powers to restrict the circulation of
fake COVID-19 news should also force scholars and judges to reconsider fake news more broadly. The COVID-19 pandemic has
highlighted how dangerous fake news can be and the fatal flaws of
relying on the marketplace of ideas and counterspeech models to
nullify it. In the field of public health, the risks are high. The
dangers of fake news in general have become much more apparent
since the Supreme Court decided United States v. Alvarez in 2012.
Scholars and legislators alike should, like with the balancing
analysis under inherent powers, query what the value of fake news
is under the First Amendment and what risks it poses to U.S.
society as a whole.
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